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BOOK REVIEWS
Insights into the Woes of a Profession
REVIEW OF How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails Its Creative Minds,
by Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado.
REVIEWED BY THERESA M. BEINER*
In their recent book, How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails Its
Creative Minds,1 law professors Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado attempt to
account for the widespread professional misery reportedly experienced by many
of today's lawyers. Although Professors Stefancic and Delgado are not the first
academics to explore this issue, they do so in a novel manner by comparing the
lives of and describing the relationship between two major American figures:
poet Ezra Pound and "lawyer-poet-public-servant" Archibald MacLeish. Look-
ing at the plight of the modem American lawyer through the lens of the lives and
relationships of these historic men adds a richness to the authors' discussion that
reveals that the difficulties faced by today's lawyers are uniquely American.
Specifically, Professors Stefancic and Delgado lay blame for the current
dissatisfaction with the practice of law in America on formalism, the predominant
jurisprudential theory employed in American law schools and used in practice.
Formalism is a type of legal reasoning developed by Langdell, the influential
former Dean of Harvard Law School. Formalism posits that law is a science
through which "lawyers c[an] derive correct legal judgments from a few
fundamental principles and concepts." 2 In the context of modem lawyering, it
generally means that lawyers and judges can come to consistent results by
applying abstract legal rules to fact patterns without considering any social policy
issues, including knowledge gained from other sources such as social science.
* Nadine H. Baum Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H.
Bowen School of Law. © 2007, Theresa M. Beiner. The author would like to thank members of the faculty at the
Bowen School who critiqued a presentation on the contents of this article. Jessie Cranford, Richard Delgado,
John DiPippa, Lawrence Krieger, Michael Flannery, and Nancy Levit likewise provided helpful comments and
suggestions. Finally, Stella Phillips provided essential research support.
1. JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FALS ITS
CREATIVE MtNns 3 (Duke University Press 2005).
2. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
3. In this review, I will refer to these sources as "extra-legal" sources of knowledge.
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The book leads its readers to the conclusion that formalism is to blame for
lawyer dissatisfaction (and makes some transformative suggestions) through a
series of seven chapters, broken into two distinct parts. Part I chronicles the lives
of Ezra Pound and Archibald MacLeish as they relate to the authors' overall
thesis. The authors explain how formalism influenced the lives as well as the
work of these two important-and very different-men. Part II details the
problems modem lawyers face in law school and practice, suggesting that the
root of lawyer discontent flows from the formalistic approach taken to learning
and working with the law. In addition, Professors Stefancic and Delgado discuss
the medical profession as a point of comparison to the modem legal profession.
All in all, the book may well raise as many questions as it answers. It does,
however, offer lawyers, academics, and those who live or work with lawyers, an
alternative and novel theory for what plagues lawyers and the legal profession.4
While it is not clear that formalism bears all or even the majority of fault for
lawyers' misery, it provides an intriguing way of looking at the numerous
problems of modem legal practice. Furthermore, the idea that formalism is at the
root of these problems may contain a kernel of truth. As studies of law students
described later in this review suggest, the authors appear to be onto something
with their thesis.5
Although the book speaks more in generalities and thus does not tell lawyers
precisely what to do to improve their plight, it does provide a point of departure
for further discussion about what ails lawyers and how they might move toward
bettering their profession. The generalities the authors speak in are not a
weakness, however, as it would have been a folly for them to attempt to solve
such a complex problem in so short and readable a volume. 6 Indeed, one strength
of this book is that busy lawyers are likely to have time to read it and consider its
implications for their lives.
In the end, however, Professors Stefancic and Delgado fail to present a
convincing case that formalism is to blame for the misery experienced by some
lawyers. The problem of modem lawyer unhappiness is more multi-faceted than
they account for and may well be the result of an aspect of legal practice that
lawyers-and the public-would be loathe to change: the adversary system itself.
Further, evidence suggests that lawyers may not be as miserable as commonly
believed, and to the extent that they are, this misery may well be a result of the
personality traits common among those attracted to the legal profession rather
than attributable to any specific externality. Finally, the nature of the business of
law has no doubt changed over time, making at least some lawyers' lives more
difficult. Yet, the link between lawyers' business practices and formalism is
4. Law professors have suggested various other theories for lawyer misery, including the business nature of
the modem legal profession. For further discussion of other theories, see infra Part IV.
5. See infra notes 134-157 and accompanying text.
6. The book is a mere 85 pages long.
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tenuous at best. All this leads one to conclude that a host of social, economic, and
personal circumstances might play a part, along with formalism, in explaining
lawyers' misery.
I. FORMALISM AS THE PROBLEM
Professors Stefancic and Delgado begin their book by proposing that the root
cause of lawyers' unhappiness is formalism. As they describe:
In law, formalism is connected to the rule of precedent and conservative
judging. In legal education, formalism manifests itself in teaching of rules and
doctrines at the expense of social implications and policy. It exalts internal
values such as consistency over ambiguity, rationality over emotion, rules over
social context or competing interests and narratives.7
Formalism limits other disciplines and, in the times of Ezra Pound and
Archibald MacLeish, had implications for literature, including poetry. Hence,
Professors Stefancic and Delgado use the lives of the poet Pound and of the
lawyer-turned-poet-turned-statesman MacLeish as a starting point for examining
the limitations that formalism imposes on its adherents, or, perhaps, its
"captives." Here, the authors are on sure ground, and write forcefully and
eloquently.
II. POUND AND MACLEISH
Part I of the book examines the lives of and relationship between Pound and
MacLeish. By the end of this section of the book, Pound emerges as an imperfect
anti-formalist, while MacLeish is perceived as someone who was plagued by
formalism in both law and-at times-in his poetry. Professors Stefancic and
Delgado use the lives of these men as a compelling backdrop and point of
comparison for their overall thesis that formalism is to blame for much of
lawyers' misery.
They begin with the story of the poet Ezra Pound. Pound's life appears at first
to have little to do with the practice of law or what it is about that practice that
makes lawyers miserable. The authors explain how Pound traveled to and lived in
London, Paris, and finally Italy, where he became a fan of Mussolini and of
fascism. 8 His sympathies for Mussolini led him to deliver a series of radio
broadcasts critical of United States officials9 that later formed the basis of his
indictment in the United States for treason. Eventually, U.S. authorities caught up
with Pound after World War II and returned him to the United States, where a
7. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at xi.
8. Id. at xiii.
9. /d. at 9.
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court tried him and found him to be of unsound mind.1 ° He was subsequently
confined to a psychiatric hospital for ten years." MacLeish eventually came to
Pound's aid and was instrumental in his release from prison. 12
So what does Pound's life reveal about formalism and its limitations? The
authors explain that Pound rejected the formalism popular in the poetry of his
time. He challenged conventions in poetry. He advised those who asked him to
"write simply and in their own voices."'13 Still, Pound was a problematic figure
and an inadequate anti-formalist role model. An anti-Semitic racist supporter of
fascists, Pound hardly seems like a likely role model (as the authors acknowl-
edge) for lawyers who have "lost their way."
MacLeish, on the other hand, was trained at Harvard Law School where he was
indoctrinated in formalism, the predominant mode of legal reasoning employed
during his time and, as the authors explain, still used today. After graduation,
MacLeish spent three years practicing with a Boston law firm doing work that he
found deadening. As MacLeish explained:
The law is crowded-interesting-& full of despair. It offers its own rewards,
but none other. Nothing that I would gladly be or have promises through its
development. As a game there is nothing to match it. Even living is a poor
second. But as a philosophy, as a training for such eternity as the next hour
offers it is nowhere-a mockery of human ambitions. 14
MacLeish finally gave up law firm practice and moved to Paris to write poetry
full-time. It is during this time that he sought the advice of Ezra Pound. MacLeish
considered Pound "an agent of change who was ushering in a new form of poetic
organization." 15 Yet, Pound was extremely critical of MacLeish's poetry,
apparently finding it too affected. 16
Some years later, MacLeish returned to the United States and landed a position
at Fortune magazine. 17 While at Fortune, he wrote a Pulitzer Prize winning poem
called Conquistador. 1 8 After eight years with the magazine, MacLeish entered
government service in the Roosevelt administration.1 9 Just as MacLeish was
settling into his government job, Pound was making anti-American broadcasts in
Italy. While MacLeish continued to admire Pound the poet, he held Pound the
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 25-26.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 15 (quoting Letter from Archibald MacLeish to the MacLiesh Family (Aug. 1921), in ARCHIBALD
MACLEISH, LErrERS OF ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, 1907 TO 1982, at 85 (R. Winnick ed., 1983)).
15. Id. at 17.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 21.
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political actor in "contempt,, 20 and did nothing to stop Pound's initial court-
ordered hospitalization.
MacLeish finally did intervene-and intervene effectively-on Pound's
behalf, although it took ten years. So, why did MacLeish, an avid anti-fascist and
loyal public servant, step in to help the anti-formalist Pound? Professors
Stefancic and Delgado consider two common theories: sympathy and public
calling.21 Ultimately, they find neither explanation satisfying. Instead, they posit
that "[iln rescuing Pound, MacLeish rescued himself, attaining psychological and
personal integration and a sense of closure. 22 In a sense, by helping Pound,
MacLeish found a way to bring meaning to the dreary practice of law. With the
threat of fascism a thing of the past, it simply looked bad for the United States to
incarcerate its most noted poet. With shifting sentiments, it became acceptable
for MacLeish, a member of the liberal political establishment of his time, to argue
for Pound's release.23
With the lives and relationship of these men as a backdrop, Professors
Stefancic and Delgado argue that lawyers' discontent has two components: "a
conceptual dimension, concerned with how they understand what they do, and a
phenomonologial one that embraces the felt experience of law and lawyering.' '2 4
The authors suggest that lawyers still struggle today with these effects of
formalism, as MacLeish did decades ago. The authors posit: "Here we are half a
century later. Are we doing much better?"2 5 In the chapters that follow, they
answer that question with a resounding, "No."
1. THE "DIscONTENTS": MODERN LAWYERS
In Part II of the book, entitled "Discontents," the authors attempt to make the
case that lawyers are miserable because of formalism. A large portion of this
section of the book is spent describing the many aspects of modem legal
practice-from high billable hours to the drudgery that is the routine nature of the
work-that make it miserable. Professors Stefancic and Delgado lay blame for
these unfortunate aspects of the legal profession in formalism, which they
describe in Chapter 3. They do this by using MacLeish's legal world as the
backdrop for a discussion of the lives of today's lawyers. Yet, the reader is left
wondering whether today's lawyers, whose practice is so dependent on technol-
ogy and the "bottom line," are really as similar to those of MacLeish's day as
Professors Stefancic and Delgado's thesis suggests.
In developing the link between lawyers' discontent and formalism, the authors
20. Id. at 22.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. at 27.
23. Id. at 28.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id. at 30.
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admit that they are not making their case rigorously. As they tell the reader, "[w]e
paint here with a broad brush, seeking not perfect proof but rather a story or
narrative that will resonate with the reader, who may have encountered
something similar in his or her life.",26 To the formalist lawyer, this admission is
less than satisfying. But the authors explain that the proof of their thesis-or, as
they put it, "at least, persuasion,27-will become evident in subsequent chapters
in which they detail the many ways lawyers are dissatisfied with modem legal
work. True to their approach to jurisprudence,28 Professors Stefancic and
Delgado use "a story or narrative that will resonate with the reader. ' 29 In this
manner, the remainder of the book emerges as an example of an anti-formalist
approach to the problem of lawyer discontent. The authors are, in a sense,
practicing what they preach. They are using nontraditional legal tools, whether
social science studies or stories, to describe the problem they identify. To a
lawyer who finds more comfort in formalism, the "proof' provided by the authors
may seem merely anecdotal.
Professors Stefancic and Delgado concisely and effectively define their terms
in this portion of the book, telling the reader what formalism is and how it became
the dominant jurisprudential theory that is used in the law school classroom. As
they explain, "[1]egal formalism is associated with a form of education that
emphasizes doctrines and cases and minimizes external factors, such as justice,
social policy, and politics. It imagines law as an autonomous discipline existing
apart from others; it is not at all interdisciplinary., 30 After the authors define
formalism, they describe the evolution of jurisprudence through legal realism and
its successor movements (such as critical legal studies, radical feminism, and
critical race theory). They explain how through this evolution, formalism
endured, keeping "a strong hold on legal education" and the court system itself.3'
While the authors acknowledge that the Warren Court, for a brief period, was
willing to consider factors outside of the formalist tradition,32 the authors note
that more recently the courts have returned to the "black letter" approach to the
law, "even when deciding cases of great social importance., 3
3
Interestingly, the authors explain that at the same time the Warren Court was
considering the transformative possibilities of law, legal practice was becoming
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id.
28. Professors Stefancic and Delgado often employ critical race theory, which has a tradition of relying on
narratives. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L.
REV. 461,462 (1993). This bibliography contains reference to several articles by Professor Delgado.
29. STEFANcic & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 34.
30. Id. at 35.
31. Id. at38.
32. Stefancic and Delgado explain that the Warren Court considered "equity, evolving standards of
conscience, [and] the historical background of a case" in making its decisions. Id. at 38.
33. Id.
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more "disciplined, routinized, compartmentalized, and result-driven; lawyers,
highly accountable for their time."34 The authors indicate that this was the same
period when law firms became more hierarchically structured-the work of many
associates propping up the extravagant lifestyles of partners. Yet, this seems out
of sync with a Supreme Court (and one would assume, lower federal courts that
would be following suit) that was more open to creativity in legal argument and
the expansion of rights. The authors provide no explanation as to why at the time
when the Court was becoming less formalistic, law firms adopted what
Professors Stefancic and Delgado view as a more formalist approach to the
practice of law. This is one of several questions this book raises but leaves
unanswered.
The politics of formalism, Professors Stefancic and Delgado explain, tend
toward conservatism. This makes sense. If formalism in law eliminates extra-
legal forms of knowledge, change is likely to be slower. As the authors point out,
formalism limits courts to legal doctrine as the source of answers to legal
questions. This limits other considerations, such as "equity, mercy, economics,
and class relations," from the calculation and gives legal reasoning a "bloodless
quality," ignoring, as the authors eloquently explain, that "courts write in a field
of pain and death."' 35 The authors acknowledge the teachings of legal realism,
which counsel that law is much more indeterminate than the formalist approach
suggests. Instead, judges have a range of approaches to use in deciding a given
case and are informed by background factors, such as class and personal
preferences, in doing so. Certainly, political scientists have shown that, for the
federal judiciary, the political affiliation of the appointing president appears to
influence the decision making of individual federal judges.36
The authors use several famous Supreme Court cases to illustrate the formalist
approach in legal decision making, including Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New
York, and Brown v. Board of Education.37 The use of Brown is particularly
interesting, as it can be interpreted as a case in which the Court was willing to
consider extra-formalist arguments in an effort to dismantle segregation in public
schools. For example, the controversial footnote 11 of the opinion, in which the
Court relied on social science data to support its argument that segregation leads
to a sense of inferiority in African American children, illustrates how the Court
34. Id. at 39.
35. Id. at 40.
36. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 597, 600-01 (2003) (describing political science theory and studies
supporting the attitudinal model of decision making). Stefancic and Delgado are wise to acknowledge legal
realism-a jurisprudential movement that, in attacking formalism, allowed lawyers to use policy in making
legal arguments. For a general description of legal realism, see Roy L. BROOKS, STRUcruRES OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 89-109 (2d ed. 2005).
37. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 40-44 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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relied on extra-legal arguments and data in reaching the outcome of that case.38
However, the overall aftermath of Brown provides yet another example of
formalism. As the authors explain, the decision did very little to desegregate
schools. Instead, many white parents simply placed their children in all-white
private schools. The authors explain the aftermath of Brown as the inevitable
outcome of formalism: "[i]f the blacks are free to send their children to the school
they choose, these parents seemed to reason, so are we: Legal Formalism 101.,
3 9
In spite of the formalist ramifications of Brown, the authors acknowledge the
non-formalist reasoning that in fact underlies the case. As they note, legal
academics were quick to condemn the decision as unprincipled from a legal
standpoint. Certainly, with Plessy as the outstanding precedent on the issue, no
legal principle required public schools to be desegregated. But, as the authors
suggest, that is not the point:
One could examine cases and doctrines forever and not find one disclosing that
sending all the black children to school in a closet would be socially damaging.
It is social knowledge that tells us this; everyone who lives in our world knows
it. "The life of the law is not logic, but experience," Oliver Wendell Holmes, an
early realist, once wrote .... Sometimes law must look to other sources of
information, intuition, common sense, and prudential knowledge.4°
Unfortunately, formalism does not permit the use of "other sources of informa-
tion," 4' but instead relies on a "cookie-cutter" approach to legal analysis,
whereby the lawyer purportedly plugs the facts into the legal standard and out
pops the answer. This does not permit lawyers to consider other knowledge they
possess that might affect the outcome and therefore makes the practice of law a
"deadening" endeavor. This is especially problematic today, Professors Stefancic
and Delgado suggest, because formalism is experiencing a resurgence. Both legal
education and the Supreme Court have resorted once again to the formalist
tradition. To support this proposition, the authors note the prominence of the
MacCrate Report in legal education which emphasized skills training, and
discuss an influential article written by Federal Judge Harry Edwards, who
criticized legal academic scholarship as being too theoretical and not practical
enough to be helpful to those who practice law. 42 The authors suggest that their
38. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11.
39. STEFANcic & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 43.
40. Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,469 (1897)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 44 (citing Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MIcH. L. Rav. 34, 58 (1992)). A recent Westlaw citing references search revealed that the
Edwards article has been cited or discussed in one hundred law review articles. Similarly, another Westlaw
search revealed that the MacCrate Report is mentioned, cited, or discussed in 876 articles. The MacCrate Report
is also is the subject of 62 law journal articles. See, e.g., Gary Laser, Significant Circular Developments: The
MacCrate Report and Beyond, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 425 (1994); Wallace Loh, Introduction: The MacCrate
Report- Heuristic or Prescriptive? 69 WASH. L. REV. 505 (1994).
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publication discouraged those who were interested in exploring theory, including
critical scholars and postmodernists, from doing so.
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court, after the 1960s and 1970s, became
populated with what Professors Stefancic and Delgado call "technocrats": judges
who are "more formalistic, technical, and otherworldly than usual."43 Reasoning
that is reminiscent of the Lochner era has re-emerged, with judges relying on
federalism, original intent, and extreme textualism in an effort to narrow the
scope of progressive federal legislation. They cite examples-Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. as well as other
affirmative action precedent, and McClesky v. Kemp4-all of which limited the
law's transformative potential and maintained the status quo. The authors reason
that legal practice has evolved much the way that the legal reasoning employed
by the modem Supreme Court has: as the Supreme Court's reasoning has become
more formalized and rigid, so has legal practice itself. Modem legal practice has
mirrored modem Supreme Court jurisprudence and become routine.45
A. UNHAPPY LAWYERS
With this backdrop on the nature and evolution of legal reasoning in place,
Professors Stefancic and Delgado present a grim picture of the life of today's
lawyer. Aside from an equally grim look at the lives of doctors in Chapter 6,
Chapters 4-7 read like a cautionary tale for anyone who might be considering law
school or law as a career.
In the first chapter in this series, the authors make a direct link between
lawyers' unhappiness and legal formalism. As they explain:
In law, formalism is connected to the rule of precedent and conservative
judging. In legal education, it manifests itself in the teaching of rules and
doctrines at the expense of social analysis. Formalism exalts internal values,
such as ironclad consistency over ambiguity, sterile rationality over multifari-
ous interpretations, rigid rules over social context and competing perspectives.
In legal practice, it appears in the form of narrow specialization, hierarchical
organization of the law firm, the relentless pursuit of billable hours, and
elephantine briefs addressing every conceivable eventuality and line of
authority.46
While Professors Stefancic and Delgado are quick to acknowledge that formal-
ism does have some advantages-it allows for some actions that should be
routine to be completed in a routine manner and "enables the rapid delivery of a
43. STEFANcic & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 45.
44. Id. (citing Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
45. Id. at 46.
46. Id. at 48-49 (footnotes omitted).
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product"" 7-they explain that "if taken to an extreme, [formalism] can draw all
spirit out of work, robbing it of richness, detail, juice, and anything else that
might render it sustaining.""8 Linking this aspect of formalism to the discontent
that MacLeish experienced as a lawyer (and incidentally the problems with his
poetry, which reflected the formalism of his literature training at Yale), the
authors use Pound, who eschewed the formalism in poetry of his era, for
contrast."9
Professors Stefancic and Delgado then devote many pages to describing the
unhappy state of today's lawyers. Relying on social science and popular media
surveys, they reveal lawyers to be seriously discontent human beings who
experience high rates of divorce, burnout, mental illness, and drug and alcohol
addiction. However, the authors are not satisfied with merely providing a
description of lawyers' profound unhappiness-they point out that the public
does not like lawyers either. °
But why are lawyers so unhappy? The authors indicate that the discontent
stems in large part from the long hours lawyers are forced to spend engaging in
repetitious, boring work in order to satisfy their minimum billable hours
requirement. In addition, the authors identify a variety of law firm practices that
exacerbate these problems, including specialization, the impersonal nature of
large law firms, the lack of collegiality and general competitiveness of these
firms, the business orientation of most modern law firms which increasingly
measure lawyers' success quantitatively, and the lack of opportunities for lawyers
to do meaningful pro bono work. The authors explain that lawyers' bad reputation
with the public does not help matters and that many lawyers become so
dissatisfied that they consider leaving the profession. Like MacLeish, the authors
explain, lawyers find practice dull with little opportunity to be creative. 5
Professors Stefancic and Delgado end Chapter 4 by asking whether MacLeish
and today's lawyers might not just be whiners-well educated folks who are not
terribly sympathetic, given their high earnings and status. In Chapter 5, however,
the authors suggest that lawyers have good reason for being unhappy.
Professors Stefancic and Delgado delve further into the root of lawyers'
unhappiness and explain that it starts in law school, which they describe as an
ultra-competitive environment that is stressful and does little to meet human
needs. 2 They indicate that law students end up having the same types of
problems that practicing lawyers have-physical and mental illness, relationship
47. Id. at 49.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 50.
50. Id. at 51.
51. Id. at 61.
52. Id. at 63.
[Vol. 20: 101
INSIGHTS INTO THE WOES OF A PROFESSION
problems, weight control problems, and chemical dependencies.53 The authors
highlight the psychological toll that law school has on students who are
constantly faced with contradictions and dichotomies, such as that there is a
"right" answer to a legal question while learning that many legal decisions may
be supported by nothing more than the whim of the particular judge and that
everyone is equal before the law while learning that race is a predictive factor in
whether someone will receive the death penalty. 54 It is no wonder that law
students become disillusioned when confronted with three years of such
inconsistencies. 5 The authors explain that the problems first presented in law
school continue once lawyers enter practice as they vie for partnership
opportunities and are pressured to meet high billable hour requirements. In this
world, the authors lament, marriages break up and lawyers encounter psychologi-
cal problems twice as frequently as the general population.56
Unlike the practitioners of formalism, Professors Stefancic and Delgado make
effective use of extra-legal data to support their theory that lawyers are indeed
miserable for some very good reasons. They point out that modem lawyers have
no time to do much other than work and that work-balance issues predominate,
giving lawyers little time for exercise or proper nutrition. From this, the authors
conclude, the deterioration of lawyers' physical health is to be expected. One of
the more disturbing statistics the authors cite is that female lawyers "who worked
more than forty-five hours per week were three times more likely to suffer a
miscarriage than those who worked less."57 Based on this statistic alone, it seems
obvious that the modem practice of law takes a remarkable physical and
emotional toll.
According to the book, today's lawyers also run a high risk of alcohol and drug
abuse. Professors Stefancic and Delgado explain that "[1]awyers as a group are
very heavy drinkers, even more than undergraduates, law students, or the
population at large.",58 And, in addition to having problems with substance abuse,
the authors indicate that today's lawyers commonly have marital problems. The
book states that the divorce rate among female lawyers is twice that of doctors.59
Incidentally, the book also points to studies that show that marriage is a source of
happiness and wellness for people while divorce is yet another source of stress.
60
The authors conclude that the extent to which lawyers experience more divorce
than other adult members of the population contributes to their physical
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. In my experience, I find it perhaps more disturbing that students are willing to accept these dichotomies
as unstoppable and how quickly law students become cynics.
56. Id. at 64.
57. Id. at 65-66.
58. Id. at 67.
59. Id. at 68.
60. Id.
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problems. 6' Furthermore, lawyers also suffer from disproportionate psychologi-
cal problems, including a higher incidence of depression than that experienced by
people with non-legal occupations. The book describes studies that show that law
students likewise are depressed.62 The worrisome result of this, as the authors
lament, is that many lawyers are left burnt out and eventually even drop out of
practice altogether.63
After presenting these issues, Professors Stefancic and Delgado consider
whether the real cause of pervasive lawyer unhappiness is simply life in large law
firms. To explore this idea, Professors Stefancic and Delgado look to the
satisfaction levels among lawyers in smaller firms and are unable to draw a
meaningful conclusion, pointing out that the evidence is mixed: some surveys
suggest small firm lawyers are happier, while others show that their experiences
are not all that different from those of large firm lawyers. 6 Professors Stefancic
and Delgado note that small firm work is often repetitive and posit that, if
formalism is indeed the cause of lawyer discontent, it is hard to see how the size
of the firm could make much difference.
After comprehensively discussing current dissatisfaction among lawyers, the
authors explore aspects of the medical profession as a point of comparison. They
suggest that while formalism may be the cause of lawyers' unhappiness, doctors
draw their discontent from a different external source: the advent of managed
care and HMOs. 65 The authors indicate that like law, medicine has become a
routine, or "cookie-cutter," practice.66 They further describe studies showing
that, similar to its attitude towards lawyers, the public is becoming increasingly
antagonistic towards doctors.6 7 Furthermore, the same problems of stress, drug
abuse, and specialization plague doctors.68 And, similar to the genesis of lawyers'
discontent, the authors indicate that doctors' problems begin in medical school,
where they are taught to view cadavers as an instrument for scientific learning
rather than as a human being and therefore learn to be-and, in fact, are expected
to be-detached and objective from day one.6 9 The authors suggest that as the
practice of medicine becomes less about helping people and more about learning
a trade, career changes and disenchantment within the medical profession grow.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 68-69.
63. Id. at 70.
64. See id. at 71.
65. Id. at 72.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 73.
68. See id. at 74-75.
69. Id. at 75.
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B. THE SOLUTION TO LAWYERS' WELL-PAID MISERY
The authors conclude the book with a chapter entitled, "High-Paid Misery." In
it, they suggest different approaches to law practice that might alleviate some of
lawyers' unhappiness. As they explain:
The link is easily stated: if you allow yourself to think of what you do in
crabbed terms, you are apt to find yourself working in a crabbed workplace as
well. Another way of putting it is that if you allow your repertory of thoughts,
ideas, and categories to atrophy you are likely to end up thinking and working
in sterile settings. Or, unless you fight against external forces pressing you to
reduce what you do to a formula, those forces will make you do it faster,
cheaper, and with less room for discretion and autonomy. Work recapitulates
thought.7 °
But, how should lawyers implement this advice? Professors Stefancic and
Delgado suggest that "[d]ismantling needless regimentation, excessive specializa-
tion, and the insane pursuit of more and more billable hours in the workplace
frees the mind to consider new ideas.",71 However, they do not explain how
lawyers can actually do this within the context of today's "businesslike" practice
of law. Rather, the authors pose a series of probing rhetorical questions: "When
lawyers, doctors, and others are freed from needless regimentation, what will
they do with their freedom? What will they think about? How will they practice?
Which initiatives will they sponsor?"
72
In this regard, the book is less satisfying. One can just envision a new associate
in a large law firm trying to explain to a partner that she can not work that
weekend on a case because she needs time to explore personal pursuits and to
"consider new ideas." She would likely be laughed out of the office. The reader
cannot help but wonder how lawyers are actually expected to accomplish what
the authors suggest. How can lawyers avoid the traps of formalism and change
their practice for the better?
The simple act of identifying what makes lawyers (and doctors) miserable is
the crucial first step in the battle to reclaim the legal profession for thoughtful
individuals. And, if Professors Stefancic and Delgado have correctly identified
the root cause of lawyer misery as formalism, they have contributed a great deal
to helping lawyers attack the problem. It is elementary that a problem must be
identified before it can be solved.
The authors concede that there have been numerous attempts by scholars and
others to figure out what it is about the practice of law that makes lawyers
miserable.7 3 However, Professors Stefancic and Delgado's approach is novel
70. Id. at 77-78.
71. Id. at 78.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 47-48.
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because it blames what happens to lawyers on the predominant jurisprudential
theory used in legal practice. If the authors are correct, there is room for others,
including perhaps the authors themselves, to contribute suggestions about
practical ways to ameliorate the misery.
So what, according to Professors Stefancic and Delgado, is the solution? Are
they suggesting that lawyers and the practice of law be less disciplined? No. The
authors are quick to point out that lawyers must be disciplined.74 In this regard,
they criticize Pound "whose mind raced from one crackpot theory to another.
75
They explain that MacLeish had something that Pound did not: "a rigorous mind
and attention to detail," which he learned in law school.7 6 At this point, the
authors come artfully full circle: they return to the stories of Pound and MacLeish
and how their lives might inform today's practice of law.
In this regard, the authors place the Langdellian formalist approach to legal
education 77 in the context of greater social movements occurring at the same
time.78 In particular, the rise of industrialization was synonymous with the rise of
the "robber barons" who needed a corps of lawyers to defend them against all
manner of claims brought by the masses-workers, consumers, innocent
bystanders who were maimed, or organized labor.79 Thus, just as industrialization
led to standardization in industry, it led to standardization in law. In addition, the
authors explain that scientific method was in its heyday during MacLeish and
Pound's time, with Darwin's publication of the The Origins of Species and the
pioneering work of Alexander Graham Bell, Thomas Edison, and Henry Ford.8 °
It is easy to understand, given the influence of these great scientific minds, that
legal minds like Langdell would attempt to incorporate the scientific method into
legal analysis. The jurisprudential result was, of course, formalism.
Acknowledging that legal realism and other critical theories dominated over
formalism for a period of time, Professors Stefancic and Delgado see modem
theoretical movements such as law and economics as a "new version" of
formalism. 81 The authors also indicate that growing law firms, the MacCrate
report, and judges such as Harry Edwards told law schools to produce lawyers
who were ready to practice in the highly routine technical practice that was taking
hold of the nation's law firms. Professors Stefancic and Delgado posit that it was
74. Id. at 78.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 78.
77. Langdell led the move to formalism at Harvard Law School during MacLeish's time. He introduced the
idea that law was science and developed the case study method used in law schools. As Professors Stefancic and
Delgado explain, "[s]tudents were expected to distill principles of law out of masses of case material, in the
manner of an empirical science." Id. at 78-79.
78. Id. at 79.
79. Id. at 79.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 80.
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during the 1960s, when formalism was on the skids in the courts thanks to the
progressive Warren Court, that lawyers had more career options. During this era,
a lawyer could become a Thurgood Marshall-type reformer or even a "revolution-
ary" like Oscar "Zeta" Acosta.82 It is not surprising therefore that this period also
produced new legal theories and the expansion of rights as lawyers were freer to
be creative, thinking beings. It was during this time, when formalism was ebbing,
that lawyers were more free and able to be more creative. Lawyers could be more
like Pound.
The authors are quick to point out that this does not mean that lawyers reading
the book should try to become "Ezra Pound." As they explain, "[w]e certainly do
not need more of Pound's disorder and indiscipline. 83 However, the authors do
not provide lawyers with any role model other than Pound. Instead, they speak in
generalities, noting that "our civilization needs to afford its thinkers, teachers,
lawyers, physicians, and ordinary citizens more room to experiment, grow, and
breathe." 84 This approach is in line with some provocative economic thinking
that suggests that the United States is moving from a service economy to a
"creative" economy, whereby the country will thrive, or sit in economic
stagnation, depending on its ability to attract and maintain a society of creative
people.85 This theory accounts for the economic prosperity of such places as the
San Francisco Bay Area and Austin, Texas.8 6 What distinguishes these places
from other parts of the country is the freedom with which people living and
working there are allowed to experiment with ideas and lifestyles. Professors
Stefancic and Delgado note that the need for such freedom extends beyond
professionals like lawyers and doctors. Everyone, including factory workers,
needs this creative space. Exactly how such space is to be created in the context
of the practice of law, or even of factory work, is left to the mind of the creative
lawyer and line worker. To their credit, Professors Stefancic and Delgado have a
few suggestions for the factory worker as well.87
Throughout the book, the practice of law is illustrated in contradistinction to
what poets do. While poets try to convey reality, lawyers are asked to fit a factual
scenario into existing legal rules. In legal practice, facts that have no bearing on
the application of the particular rule at issue are deemed irrelevant, even though
82. Acosta is perhaps best known as the pal of Gonzo journalist Hunter S. Thompson during the writing and
living of Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas. For a discussion of Mr. Acosta's defense strategies, see Mary Romero,
Brown is Beautiful: Reviewing Ian F Haney Lopez's Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice, 39 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 211 (2005).
83. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 81.
84. Id.
85. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLAss 44-66 (2002).
86. See id. at 215-17, 237 thl. 13.1.
87. STEFANcic & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 81 (suggesting that workers should be allowed to change jobs
periodically, take exercise breaks, have a voice in how the workplace is structured, be offered classes in how the
product is made and marketed, and learn how the machines run).
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average human beings might believe that these "irrelevant" facts should have
something to do with the outcome of the case. As the authors indicate, "[e]ven
when correct within its narrow system, this is always a kind of world-killing
exercise-in less polite language, a lie."8 8 Poetry, therefore offers advantages over
the modem practice of law.
Yet, the authors also state that not all lawyers should be poets. They explain
that,
[miany lawyers might well be happier if their lives contained more poetry-if
they could slow down and read, or even write, a poem sometimes. But
thousands more would benefit if their lives contained more leisure, more
contemplation, more time to think seriously about what they do, and, even,
enjoy it.89
In this way, Professors Stefancic and Delgado provide a glimpse at a solution to
the lack of creativity problem, but stop short of providing a complete answer and
therefore may leave the average lawyer-reader dissatisfied. More time to think is
very attractive, but the difficulty of attaining it in the current paradigm of law
practice is undeniable. Perhaps the authors are asking lawyers to challenge that
paradigm and ultimately reject it. However, what that "new" practice of law that
throws off the constraints of formalism might look like remains elusive even at
the end of the book. Given the difficulty of employing many of the vague
suggestions alluded to by the authors, exactly what is the unhappy modem lawyer
to do, short of leaving practice altogether?
IV. Is FORMALISM REALLY THE PROBLEM?
Strict formalism no doubt leaves modem law practice with little creativity and
the law itself with less potential for transformation. It is unclear, however,
whether the practice of law is actually as boring and void of creativity as the
authors suggest. For example, there appears to be an increasing interdisciplinary
aspect to the practice of law. This should make legal argumentation more creative
and increase law's transformative potential, making the practice of law more
satisfying. In addition, some studies suggest that the extent of lawyer misery may
well be overstated.90 Finally, it remains unclear whether the things that make
lawyers miserable necessarily stem from an internal problem with the practice
itself that may be attributable to formalism, or whether the misery associated with
today's lawyers comes instead from the evolution of legal practice into a business
that is increasingly driven by the bottom-line. I believe that the links between
formalism and the transformation of law into more of a business rather than a
88. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 83.
89. Id. at 84.
90. See infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
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profession are weak. Instead, the business nature of law, which makes practice
less satisfying, may reflect one of the weaknesses of a capitalistic economic
system in which actors are encouraged to make money as an end in and of itself.
A. IS THE PRACTICE OF LAW REALLY THAT ROUTINE?
To begin with, it appears that in many ways the practice of law is already
interdisciplinary and has led to more creative legal arguments and practice. The
Law and Society Association, which emphasizes interdisciplinary studies in law,
was founded in 1964 and continues to be a vibrant organization that nurtures
many interdisciplinary legal scholars today.9' Furthermore, evidence of the
vibrancy of the interdisciplinary aspect of modem legal practice can be found in
the many amicus briefs filed in United States Supreme Court cases each year.
These amici weigh in on issues before the Court with views from a variety of
disciplines other than law-such as psychology, psychiatry, etc.-about the
reality of the law's implications for the lives of people affected by the Court's
decisions.92 A study by political scientists Spriggs and Wahlbeck found that 64%
of amicus briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court's 1992 term included
information that was not found in the briefs for the parties.93 As they note,
"[f]requently, this additional information presents the dispute from another legal
perspective, discusses policy consequences, or comments on norms governing
the interpretation of precedent or statutes." 94 In addition, amicus briefs are "[t]he
most common method of introducing social science evidence to the Court."95
Commentators point out that the use of social science in the court system is a
direct result of the legal realist movement96-a movement that Professors
Stefancic and Delgado laud as an antidote to formalism. While use of extra-legal
evidence at the appellate level has its detractors, 97 it is likely on the rise.9 8 Indeed,
the "number of amicus briefs submitted to the Court has increased dramatically
since the 1960s." 99 And, while not all lawyers have the luxury of writing amicus
briefs to the United States Supreme Court, the increasing use of extra-legal
91. See The Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, The Law and Society Association, www.apsanet.org/content_8638.cfm.
92. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of
Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 807 (2004) (describing the influence of amicus curiae on litigation success and finding that this
influence is best explained by amici providing additional information that helps the Court determine the case).
93. James F Spriggs, 11 & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme
Court, 50 POL. REs. Q. 365, 372 (1997).
94. Id. at 372.
95. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in
Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 94 (1993).
96. See id. at 101-03.
97. See id. at 114-19.
98. See id. at 111-14 (describing cases since Brown v. Board of Education, in which the Supreme Court relied
on social science).
99. Collins, supra note 92, at 810, 811 fig. 11.
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sources in the briefs that are filed suggests that the highest Court itself considers
more "creative" and less "formalistic" approaches when making important legal
determinations. This phenomenon should trickle down to some extent to the
lower levels of the practicing bar, making the practice of law as a whole more
inspired. Indeed, it was no accident that Professors Stefancic and Delgado looked
to the United States Supreme Court in Chapter 3 for examples of formalism. The
Supreme Court sets the tone for the entire federal judiciary.
While extra-legal knowledge and argumentation do not always persuade a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court, it is clear that in some instances
they do have persuasive effect.'t° Thus, lawyers would do well to make such
arguments and rely on such extra-legal sources. The decision making of the
Supreme Court is often influenced by this extra-legal information and, even when
it is not (Professors Stefancic and Delgado cite to McCleskey v. Kemp as such a
case), °10 that does not mean that this evidence will not be persuasive in other
venues open to lawyers and legal argumentation-such as the legislature. 10 2
The authors rely on McCleskey v. Kemp to argue that the Court does not take
relevant extra-legal knowledge into account in its decision making.10 3 In
McCleskey, the Court was presented with an attack on the capital sentencing
system in Georgia. McCleskey, an African American man who had been
sentenced to death for murder, argued that the decision in his case was infected
with racism in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Eighth Amend-
ment. 104 In making this argument, McCleskey relied on the Baldus Study, a
thorough study of patterns of sentencing in Georgia's death penalty system.
10 5
This study revealed that African American defendants who killed white victims
were most likely to get the death penalty.10 6 The Court ultimately rejected the
relevance of the study to McCleskey's case, reasoning that McCleskey needed to
show that racial bias infected his own sentencing. 107 A general statistical study
was insufficient to raise an equal protection violation in his particular case.
While Professors Stefancic and Delgado are correct that the Court refused to
take the Baldus Study into account in making a decision in McCleskey's case, the
100. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citing Brief for American Educational
Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae); COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL
DYNAMICs IN COLLEGES AND UNIvERsrnEs 1-21 (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED:
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPAcr OF AFFIRMATIVE ACnON 1-27 (Gary Orfield & Michael Kurlaender eds., 2001).
101. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 118 n.42 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
102. Indeed, members of the Court in McCleskey suggested that the arguments made there were better made
to the Georgia legislature. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
103. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 118.
104. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-92.
105. Id. at 292. The Baldus study was published separately. David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George
Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J.
CIUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
106. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 292 (1987).
107. Id. at 297.
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Court did suggest that the Study is relevant to law. The opinion suggests that the
arguments made by McCleskey are better made to the Georgia legislature, which
has the authority to make the sweeping changes that the study suggests.10 8 This
case therefore encourages students to consider other avenues for legal reform
outside the adversary system-such as lobbying for legislative change. Along
with focusing on statistical studies about Georgia's administration of the death
penalty, the case also allows students to consider where change best takes
place-in the courts or legislatures. While views may differ on the outcome of
this case as a matter of law, the formalistic approach taken by the Court presents
an opportunity for students to critique formalism and consider other jurispruden-
tial theories that may be used to decide a case. McCleskey thus opens avenues for
student creativity. In effect, it encourages consideration of alternatives to
formalism.
While Professors Stefancic and Delgado argue that the disconnect between
what students' instincts tell them about what would be a just outcome and the
dictates of formalism leads students to angst, I have found that law students are
often reluctant to embrace indeterminacy in law and instead want formalism-a
more certain and "cookie-cutter" approach to the law. One need only look to the
robust market for hornbooks, black letter treatises, and nutshells for proof of this.
However, even McCleskey v. Kemp presents an opportunity to explore the
problems with formalism and the important role of extra-legal sources of
information in modem legal practice, despite the fact that the Court employed a
more formalistic approach.
In contrast, other scholars have argued that extra-legal knowledge is part of
what has made law practice problematic. As George L. Priest has noted, "[a]s a
legal scholar becomes serious about some behavioral science and sophisticated in
its practice, he is pulled away from law as a distinct subject and even as an
interesting subject."' 0 9 This leads to law, in and of itself, being less of a subject
for study. Yet, law divorced from the reality of people's lives would be a poor tool
for managing society. Thus, the use of social science, including psychology and
other disciplines, helps lawyers understand the behaviors that the law seeks to
regulate. The advantage of social science in the legal system is that it is the result
of scientific study, which, under proper circumstances, is admissible in court.
This makes it an all the more effective and creative tool for lawyers.
Thus, extra-legal knowledge does play a role in lawyering-in both practice
and law school. This is evidenced by the rise in the number of amicus briefs by
organizations that are concerned about the implications of law on their
disciplines, such as psychology and medicine. While arguments based on such
knowledge may not always carry the day in court, as they clearly did not in
108. Id. at 319.
109. George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 437,438 (1983).
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McCleskey, the court's consideration of such information allows lawyers to draw
on other areas of knowledge in making arguments. It also provides a lens through
which students who study such cases can evaluate the efficacy of formalism in
addressing widespread problems with the legal system as well as consider other
avenues for furthering broad policy concerns. This should result in lawyers and
law students finding avenues for creativity that can make law school and legal
practice more interesting.
B. ARE LAWYERS REALLY THAT MISERABLE?
Another potential problem with the book lies in one of its underlying premises:
that lawyers are miserable. If one were only to look at the portrayal of law
practice by the mass media, it would appear that this premise is unassailable. '1
However, a closer examination of some of the sources relied upon by Professors
Stefancic and Delgado to make this argument challenges their assumption, or at
least makes it unclear whether lawyers are more miserable than other modem
professionals.
Professors Stefancic and Delgado rely on the work of law professor (and
former law firm partner) Patrick Schiltz to make their claim that lawyers as a
whole are miserable. In his 1999 article, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical
Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, Professor Schiltz
makes a compelling case that lawyers, especially big firm lawyers, are
miserable."' Many of the points made by Professor Schlitz rang true to me.
However, after researching other scholarship on this topic, it appears that lawyers
may not be that miserable after all.
In the same issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review in which Professor Schiltz's
article appears, there is a responsive article written by sociologist Kathleen
Hull." 2 Hull sets forth evidence that lawyers may not be as miserable as
commentators like Schiltz suggest. She indicates that the misery accounted for in
this literature may be the result of skewed studies. As she explains, "upon closer
inspection it becomes clear that the most valid, well-designed research has
produced little if any support for the notion that lawyers are unhappy in their
work."' 1 3 Emphasizing the nature of many of the studies relied upon by Schiltz
and others, Hull argues that lawyer satisfaction studies are marred by reliability
problems. Specifically, some of the surveys commonly cited do not use random
110. See, e.g., Diana Nelson Jones, Legally Unhappy Experts Worry About Growing ide of Lawyers
Abandoning Careers, PrIrSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, May 4, 2005, at El.
111. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999); see STEFANcmc & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 56-59, 66,
68-70.
112. Kathleen E. Hull, Cross-Examining the Myth of Lawyers'Misery, 52 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1999).
113. Id. at 971.
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samples, and hence may produce biased results."' She points out that other
studies have low response rates, which likewise undermines the studies'
validity.
1 15
Hull further explains that some studies rebut the presumption that lawyers are
indeed miserable. For example, she cites American Bar Association surveys from
1984 and 1990 showing that, in those years, 81% and 76% of lawyers were
satisfied or very satisfied with their jobs. 11 6 Similarly, Hull refers to a 1990 study
by the National Law Journal that found "31% of responding lawyers 'very
satisfied' and 48% 'somewhat satisfied' with their careers." ' 1 7 Studies of
graduates of the University of Michigan law school and three Minnesota law
schools found percentages ranging from 82% to 94% of lawyers who were
satisfied (at least somewhat) with legal practice." 8 Hull cites a study of Toronto
lawyers likewise finding high rates of lawyer satisfaction.1 '9 These studies had
higher response rates, making them more reliable than studies with lower rates.
Hull criticizes Schiltz, stating "[d]espite the high quality of their data, the
Minnesota and Toronto studies are relegated to a footnote in Schiltz's discussion
of lawyers' satisfaction."' 20 Likewise, Professors Stefancic and Delgado leave
these studies largely unexplored in footnotes. 1
21
Hull has reason to be familiar with such studies. She, along with John Heinz
and Ava Hater, analyzed lawyer satisfaction data from Chicago lawyers
collected by the American Bar Foundation. This data revealed that 84% of these
lawyers reported being either satisfied or very satisfied with their jobs. 12 2 Thus,
there are studies suggesting that at least some lawyers are satisfied with their
work. However, there may be other demographic factors that have implications
for exactly which lawyers are happy.
Studies suggest, as Stefancic and Delgado point out, 12 3 that female lawyers
114. Id. at 971-73.
115. See id. at 972.
116. Id. at 972-73 (citing Am. B. Ass'n, Young Lawyers Div., The State of the Legal Profession 1990, at 1-6,
52 tbl. 66 (1991)).
117. See id. at 973 (citing Margaret Cronin Fisk, Lawyers Give Thumbs Up, NAT'L L. J., May 28, 1990, at
S2).
118. See id. at 973 (citing David L. Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers
and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & Soc. INQuIRY 251, 260, 275 (1989) and Paul W. Mattesich &
Cheryl W. Heilman, The Career Paths of Minnesota Law School Graduates: Does Gender Make a Difference?,
9 LAW & INEQ. J. 59, 63, 95 (1990)).
119. See id. (citing JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRAcnC: A STUDY OF LAWYERS' LWES 169
(1995)).
120. Id. (citing Schiltz, supra note 111, at 884 n.92).
121. See generally STEFANcIc & DELGADO, supra note 1.
122. John P. Heinz, Kathleen E. Hull & Ava A. Harter, Lawyers and Their Discontents: Findings from a
Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 ID. L.J. 735, 736 (1999); see also Marilyn Tucker, Laurie A. Albright & Patricia
L. Busk, Whatever Happened to the Class of 1983?, 78 GEo. L.J. 153, 164 (1989) (survey of graduates of a law
school class of 1983 indicated that 70% enjoyed their work).
123. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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may be more dissatisfied with their careers than men. In their study of the class of
1983, Tucker, Albright, and Busk found that, while men and women reported
roughly the same levels of satisfaction (67% and 65%, respectively), more
women than men reported being dissatisfied with their jobs (26% of women as
opposed to only 15% of men). 124 However, other studies found no gender
differences. 125 In their study of data gathered from Chicago lawyers, Heinz et al.
found no overall gender differences in work satisfaction, but instead that women
were more dissatisfied with certain aspects of their jobs, including "their level of
responsibility, recognition for work, chances for advancement, organizational
policies and administration, salary, and control over the amount and manner of
work."' 126 Other studies suggest that African American lawyers are more
dissatisfied as well. The Heinz et al. study revealed that 17.9% of black lawyers
in their sample were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied whereas only 6.1% of white
lawyers responded likewise. 127 Thus, perhaps dissatisfaction with practice is
more common for women and members of minority groups. This of course is a
serious problem that requires a more in-depth look at how legal practice affects
women and members of minority groups.
Still, it is hard to take issue with the many studies cited by Professors Stefancic
and Delgado which indicate that lawyers are using unhealthy means to deal with
the stress of practice.1 28 High divorce and substance abuse rates among lawyers
seem highly indicative of a profession that is unhealthy for its practitioners.
Indeed, Hull's criticism of Schiltz's article does not extend to his analysis of these
factors. 129 To the extent that lawyers suffer higher rates of divorce, substance
abuse, and mental health problems, it would seem obvious that members of the
legal profession are in trouble.
1. Is rr THE PEOPLE OR IS IT THE PRACTICE?
Interestingly, the book makes little mention of studies that suggest that law
practice itself may not be totally at fault for lawyer misery. Some studies indicate
that it may be the nature of the people who are attracted to the practice of law that
accounts for the profession's high rates of depression and the general unhappi-
ness among lawyers. Work by psychologist Martin Seligman and his colleagues
suggests that pessimists make effective lawyers.130 While pessimism can be a
124. Tucker et al., supra note 122, at 164; see also Heinz et al., supra note 122, at 738-39 (describing studies
showing women lawyers more dissatisfied than men).
125. See, e.g., Heinz et al., supra note 122, at 740-41, 743 (recounting studies, including their own of the
Chicago Bar, which reflect no gender differences).
126. Id. at 746-47.
127. Id. at 752.
128. See STEFANcic & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 65-69 and studies cited therein.
129. See Schiltz, supra note 111, at 874-81.
130. Martin E. P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDozo L. Rnv. 33, 40 (2001).
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detriment in many walks of life, Seligman posits that this is not the case when it
comes to lawyers. In fact, studies have shown that there is a notable correlation
between success in law school and pessimism. 1 3' As Seligman and his co-authors
explain:
These data suggest that what is labeled as pessimism is not a detriment and may
even be a virtue for lawyers. Pessimism encompasses certain "positive"
dimensions; it contains what we call-in less pejorative terms-"prudence." A
prudent perspective, which requires caution, skepticism and "reality-
appreciation," may be an asset for law or other skill-based professions. It is
certainly a quality that is embraced in legal education. Prudence enables a good
lawyer to see snares and catastrophes that might conceivably occur in any given
transaction. The ability to anticipate a whole range of problems that non-
lawyers do not see is highly adaptive for the practicing lawyer. Indeed clients
would be less effectively served if lawyers did not so behave, even though this
ability to question occasionally leads to lawyers being labeled as deal breakers
or obstructionists.132
While pessimism may well be a good quality in a successful lawyer, it may not
lead to a "happy human being.'
1 33
Despite the findings set forth in Seligman's article, studies of law school
students suggest that law school creates much of the psychological distress that
law students feel. Surveying studies of law students, Lawrence Krieger argues
that law professors "might like to believe that future lawyers arrive at law school
with these predispositions [towards psychological distress], but research and our
own eyes tell us otherwise."' 34 Krieger describes studies showing that law
students enter law school psychologically "normal," but quickly shift to
psychological distress during the first year of law school.' 35 While Krieger
suggests it is law school that causes this distress, it seems more like a classic "the
chicken or egg" dilemma: do people who are attracted to law have a
predisposition to depression or does learning and practicing law depress its
practitioners? There does not appear to be a definitive answer to this question, but
it certainly merits further consideration and study.
Along with suggesting that successful lawyers may well possess the type of
personality that makes them less happy, Seligman et al. suggest that some aspects
of the practice of law make it an inherently unhappy profession. In particular,
they indicate that low "decision latitude" and the zero-sum game nature of
131. Id. at 40.
132. Id. at 41.
133. Id.
134. Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical
Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 115 (Mar./June 2002).
135. See id. at 114 (citing Matthew Dammeyer & Narina Nunez, Anxiety and Depression Among Law
Students: Current Knowledge and Future Directions, 23 LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 55,61 (1999)).
2007]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHIcs
practice make law a difficult profession. Seligman and his colleagues write,
"[d]ecision latitude refers to the number of choices one has or, as it turns out, one
believes one has."'136 People in jobs that allow them little or no control over their
work are at risk for depression and other health problems. As Seligman et al.
explain, "[tlhere is one quadrant particularly inimical to health and morale: high
job demand combined with low decision latitude." 137 They further indicate that
along with nurses and secretaries, "junior associates at major law firms have been
added to the list" of persons who occupy this quadrant. 1
38
While these researchers believe it is the lack of control that associates have
over their lives and practice that gives them low decision latitude, it can be
argued that lawyers as a general matter have low decision latitude. This makes
sense. Litigators lack control over case outcomes due to the nature of the
adversary system. In addition, lawyers generally lack control over how cases
proceed, often finding themselves in defensive postures, forced to respond to
what adversaries or courts have done. Even corporate lawyers who do not go to
court are subject to the changing desires of clients, adversaries in the deal making
process, and the forces of an ever-changing economy. Thus, it may be that the
adversarial and uncontrollable nature of legal practice itself gives lawyers little
control over their clients' (and therefore their own) destinies.
Along with this "uncontrollable" aspect of legal practice, the zero-sum game
nature of the adversary system, Seligman et al. argue, likewise produces
unhappiness. By zero-sum game they refer to the fact that the net result of any
litigation is zero: there is always one winner and one loser with no resulting net
gain. 139 This is an inherent characteristic of the adversary system. As Seligman et
al. explain, "[w]hen the practice of law is tied up with a large number of zero-sum
games, it will produce predictable emotional consequences for the practitioner,
who will be anxious, angry and sad much of his professional life."' 4° While
acknowledging that mediation might make for happier lawyers, Seligman and his
colleagues also understand that the adversary system provides a social benefit
and should not be readily abandoned.
14 1
The upshot of all this for Professors Stefancic and Delgado's thesis is that
rather than the formalism making lawyers unhappy, a root cause of lawyer misery
may be the people attracted to law and the nature of the adversary system itself.
The profession seems to be populated with individuals who may be predisposed
(because of their pessimism) to be unhappy and who are naturally drawn to work
in a system that will lead to more unhappiness given the lack of control that it
136. Seligman et al., supra note 130, at 41.
137. Id. at 42.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 46-47.
140. Id. at 47.
141. Id. at48.
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allows its practitioners over cases and outcomes.
In contrast to the theory that unhappiness comes from within the types of
people attracted to the legal profession, emerging research on law students
suggests that there is something about law, and not the people who practice it, that
creates unhappiness. Law professor Lawrence Krieger and psychologist Kennon
Sheldon have studied law students at two law schools, analyzing the students'
sense of well-being throughout their law school careers. Their study reveals that
there is something wrong with law school-not the students who enter the legal
profession. They found that "incoming students were happier, more well-
adjusted, and more idealistic/intrinsically oriented than a comparison undergradu-
ate sample." '142 This led Krieger to conclude that problems of unhappiness and
discontent in law school and the legal profession as a whole may not be the result
of the personalities of people who chose law as a career, as the previously
mentioned studies by Seligman et al. indicate. 143
Instead, Krieger and Sheldon argue that the nature of law school and the
conflicts it causes for individuals result in lowered self-esteem, life satisfaction,
and well-being in law students. They write, "the intense pressures and competi-
tive success norms at most law schools begin a process that reorients students
away from positive personal values and towards more superficial rewards and
image-based values, leading to a loss of self-esteem, life satisfaction, and
well-being. ' 44 Krieger and Sheldon distinguish between "intrinsic motivations,"
whereby "a person engages in an activity because she finds it interesting and
enjoyable," 145 and "extrinsic motivations," which include "activity undertaken as
a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself."146 Extrinsic motivations are
associated with negative subjective well-being ("SWB"), whereas intrinsic
motivations are associated with positive SWB. 147 Sheldon and Krieger opine that
students begin law school with intrinsic motivations, but move toward extrinsic
motivations, leading to a decline in SWB."4' Thus, students begin law school
with idealistic motivations, desiring to help others or to improve themselves
personally, but eventually succumb to extrinsic motivations, such as "impressing
142. Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: Perspectives on
Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REv. 425, 433 (2005); see also Kennon M. Sheldon &
Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes
in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAv. Scl. L. 261, 270 (2004).
143. Krieger, supra note 142, at 433; see also Sheldon & Krieger, supra note 142, at 271.
144. Sheldon & Krieger, supra note 142, at 263. Earlier studies likewise have shown that law students have
higher rates of psychiatric distress than those in the general population. See, e.g., Stephen B. Shanfield & G.
Andrew H. Benjamin, Psychiatric Distress in Law Students, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 69 (1985); G. Andrew H.
Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and
Lawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 225,241, 246.
145. Sheldon & Krieger, supra note 142, at 263.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 264.
148. Id.
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others, or gaining status and affluence," and end up disillusioned with the legal
profession overall. 1
49
The findings of their study bear this out. They surveyed students throughout
their law school careers, beginning with orientation, and found that "participants
experienced large reductions in positive affect, life satisfaction, and overall
SWB, and large increases in negative affect, depression, and physical symptoms"
during their first year of law school. 150 Importantly, this correlated with declines
in intrinsic value motivation. As they explain, "[d]eclines in intrinsic value
orientation.., were significantly associated with decreases in positive affect, life
satisfaction, and aggregate SWB.'' While the correlations cannot prove
causation, these findings do support their theory. Examining these students later
in their law school careers revealed that the "declines in SWB and intrinsic
valuing.., remained constant." 152 Interestingly, "all types of valuing decreased
between the end of the first year and the middle of the second year, a pattern" that
continued through the third year surveys. 153 While acknowledging that this
phenomenon requires further study, they noted that it was consistent with the
notion that lawyers "have no values."'
154
Sheldon and Krieger replicated much of these results in a study of a second law
school. Students in Study 2 "evidenced strong declines in positive affect, life
satisfaction, and aggregate SWB, as well as strong increases in negative
affect."'155 However, "the overall change in relative intrinsic value orientation
was not significant" in the second study. 156 Similar to Study 1, "reductions in
self-determination were correlated with reductions in SWB ... as were reduc-
tions in intrinsic value orientation."'' 57 This research suggests that there may not
be some common trait among those who choose law as a career, but instead that
there is something about the law school experience itself that creates negative
effects in law students. And, if in fact the general causes of lawyer discontent
begin in law school, Professors Stefancic and Delgado may be onto something
with their theory that formalism begins causing misery in law school. Although
they do not explore these studies in their book, it would seem that the formalistic
approach to teaching the law may be the first step towards law student
dissatisfaction, which later leads to the dissatisfaction experienced by so many
American lawyers.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 272.
151. Id. at 273.
152. Id. at 274.
153. Id. at 282.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 278.
156. Id. at 279.
157. Id.
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2. Is THE NATURE OF LAW FIRMS THE PROBLEM?
Another issue raised by this book is whether small firm lawyers are more
satisfied than large firm lawyers. While Professors Stefancic and Delgado are
somewhat equivocal on this point, noting that studies point in both directions, it is
unclear whether large firm lawyers are more unhappy than small firm lawyers or
sole practitioners.1 58 This is a key question that begs an answer. The American
Bar Association ("ABA") tracks statistics regarding the nature of lawyers'
practices. In the year 2000, the ABA found that of the 74% of lawyers who were
in private practice, the vast majority were sole practitioners or practiced in small
firms. 159 Indeed, 48% were sole practitioners." 6° Of those who practiced with
others, 76% practiced in firms of 2-5 lawyers.1 61 On the basis of these statistics
and if in fact lawyers in small firm practice are happier, it seems plausible that
much of the blame for general lawyer unhappiness can be placed on the nature of
large firm practice, which tends to be the focus of much study and scholarly
discussion.1 6 2 Yet, the ABA data reveals that only 14% of lawyers in private
practice are at firms of 101 + lawyers and that only 4% of these lawyers practice
in firms of 5 1-100 lawyers. 163 Thus, if misery is more common in large firms, it
may be far less common in lawyers overall.
Indeed, some lawyer complaints detailed in Professors Stefancic and Delag-
do's book seem to be those of the big firm lawyer. For example, the authors cite
the common complaint that law firms are too hierarchical and lack mentoring
opportunities.' 64 However, these issues should be less of a problem in a smaller
firm. The authors also discuss in detail the competitive nature of large firm
practice, where associates vie for attention from powerful partners in their quest
for a shot at partnership. However, this too should not be a significant problem in
small firms. While the work in all law firms-large or small-may be equally
routine, being in a smaller firm with less hierarchy and less competition should
reduce the overall stress of law practice and result in relatively happier lawyers.
Thus, given that the majority of today's lawyers work in small firms, it is not clear
that the problems detailed in Professors Stefancic and Delgado's book are as
common for most lawyers as they suggest.
However, it is similarly not clear that working in a small firm environment is
the cure for lawyer misery. Indeed, a 1990 ABA study suggests that sole
158. See STEFANCiC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 71.
159. See ABA Lawyer Demographics (2006), available at www.abanet.org/marketresearch/
lawyerdemographics_2006.pdf [hereinafter ABA Lawyer Demographics].
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 111, at 940 (criticizing large firms and describing advantages of small
firms).
163. ABA Lawyer Demographics, supra note 159.
164. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 57, 59.
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practitioners are the least happy of all lawyers.165 However, attorneys in large
firms in the West and Northeast surveyed in this study also registered
considerable unhappiness. 166 When asked why they liked practicing law, lawyers
responding to this survey most often answered "intellectual stimulation."'167 This
response is somewhat at odds with a survey of Alabama lawyers cited by
Professors Stefancic and Delgado in which 94.5% of lawyers surveyed reported
that they were "least satisfied with the challenge and stimulation of their jobs." 168
Interestingly, the happiest lawyers were Midwestern corporate lawyers, South-
east government agency lawyers, and Western lawyers in mid-size firms.
16 9
Heinz et al.'s study of Chicago lawyers found that large firm lawyers were less
likely to respond that they were "very satisfied" with their jobs, but were also less
likely to be dissatisfied with their jobs. 1 70 Instead, it was government lawyers
who were most likely unhappy-" 11% of them were either dissatisfied or very
dissatisfied."'17 Thus, exactly which lawyers are unhappy and the extent of that
unhappiness remain largely a mystery that deserves further study by the bar and
social scientists. And, it appears that at least some lawyers are happy and find
their jobs intellectually stimulating.
C. IS THE REAL PROBLEM WITH THE BUSINESS OF LAW?
In thinking back on my years as a lawyer, I never felt that my law practice was
boring. Instead, the parts of it that bothered me were primarily driven by the
business model under which large firms operate. Put simply, the amount of time I
had to put in to make my billable goals was unreasonable. And it was obvious to
me that partners lined their pockets at my expense. In one telling moment, the
managing partner of my firm explained at an "all firm" meeting that he would not
be satisfied until there was a "new BMW in every lawyer's garage." Like many
young lawyers, I looked at the partners' lives and found them lacking. The goal of
making partner did not seem worth attaining. The material goods I would be able
to afford if I did become a partner did not seem to be worth missing my
daughter's first steps or foregoing the opportunity to teach her to ride a bicycle.
165. Thirty percent reported being dissatisfied. See Fisk, supra note 117, at S2.
166. See id.
167. Id. Seventy-five percent of lawyers responded in this manner. Fifty-eight percent responded that it
provided them with an opportunity to use their skills. See Tucker et al., supra note 122, at 163 (survey of class of
1983 revealed that 71% of respondents found their assignments "challenging," whereas only 9% found them
"dull").
168. See STEFANcic & DELGADo, supra note 1, at 57 (citing Keith B. Norman, The Alabama State Bar
Quality of Life Survey Results, 55 ALA. LAW. 152, 153 (May 1994). I use the term "somewhat" because the
questions posed by these two studies are different. Lawyers may like the intellectual stimulation of their jobs
while having little opportunity to engage in the type of work that causes such stimulation.
169. See Fisk, supra note 117, at S2.
170. See Heinz et al., supra note 122, at 745.
171. Id.
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Perhaps the real problem with law practice therefore lies not in formalism or in
the inherent nature of the people drawn to the practice of law, but rather is the
result of the business model under which most firms operate-a model (like most
in our capitalistic economic system) that is driven by profit and ultimately
greed.1 72 Indeed, in one of the books that Professors Stefancic and Delgado
discuss, Professor Mary Ann Glendon acknowledges that many lawyers believe
that the problem with law is that it has become a business, that it has become
"commercialized."1 73 While Glendon ultimately does not accept this as the
source of what ails the legal profession, much of her argument suggests that this
is a significant problem. She writes about the lack of client loyalty and the rise of
one-up-manship among partners, who want to make huge salaries to "keep up
with the Joneses." 174 Gone are the days of the wise lawyer/counselor who would
tell a client that what he or she wants to do might be marginally legal, but
ultimately violated the spirit of the law or, more simply, was immoral.175 Glendon
lays part of the blame for this unfortunate transformation on clients, who began to
shop around for lawyers instead of doing all their business with one trusted
firm. 17 6 Glendon concludes that perhaps it is not the business of law that is
directly the problem, but that lawyers have lost the ability to understand how to
function as both business people and lawyers.1 77 While this suggests that
Professors Stefancic and Delgado would agree with Glendon's conclusion,
overall they reject it.
As Professors Stefancic and Delgado point out, for Glendon, the "problem is
rapid social change leading to loss of faith in the common law heritage, coupled
with 'romantic judging' that has replaced respect for the rule of law." 178 Indeed,
Glendon takes issue with the "creativity" in law that Professors Stefancic and
Delgado suggest would promote both the happiness of lawyers as well as the
potential for law to be just, especially, from Glendon's viewpoint, when that
creativity is practiced by judges. 179
However, others would place the problem more squarely with the business that
law has become.' 80 Some lay blame more specifically on the rise of the billable
hour. 1 8 1 As one survey revealed, "[e]xcessive hours are the leading cause of
172. Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and its Discontents, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1335, 1344-46 (2000).
173. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN TME LEGAL PROFESSION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SocIETY 69-71 (1994).
174. Id. at 25, 30.
175. Id. at 25, 30.
176. Id. at 25.
177. Id. at 70-71.
178. STEFANcIc & DELGADO, supra note 1, at48 (citing id. at 152).
179. See GLENDON, supra note 173, at 152-73.
180. See Rhode, supra note 172, at 1344-46.
181. See Carl T. Bogus, The Death of An Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 922-28 (1996); Rhode,
supra note 172, at 1345-46.
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professional dissatisfaction among surveyed female practitioners."'1 2 Deborah
Rhode points out that "the preoccupation with profit is at the root of the problem"
of lawyer discontent along with an increase in competitiveness in the profes-
sion. t"3 Indeed, it may not be that law is being viewed as a business that is a
problem but instead the type of business model law firms have adopted. As
Deborah Holmes suggests, "In fact, many of [the decisions individual lawyers
make] are bottomed on old-fashioned greed, and calling them 'businesslike' is
unfair to business."'
184
The link between formalism and the business of law, while intriguing, is the
most tenuous part of Professors Stefancic and Delgado's argument, particularly
when one considers that unhappiness began in the 1960s-at the height of what
the authors acknowledge as a non-formalist movement in the Supreme Court.18 5
Yet this is the same time period when formalism in law firms begins to take hold.
Why were law firms engaging in a more "cookie-cutter" approach to practice
during a time when the courts began to allow for more creative legal argument? It
becomes difficult to see how the business model under which law firms operate
results from formalism. Instead, the business that law has become appears to be
the result of client demands and the desire for more money by lawyers at the top
of the law firm hierarchy. While Professors Stefancic and Delgado argue that
formalism plays a role in the piecemeal, routine nature of law firm practice, in
some ways that routine may be comforting to lawyers. At least, one would
assume they would be less stressed than lawyers confronting new issues on a
daily basis. Indeed, there have always been aspects of lawyers' jobs that have
been routine. The link between the routine nature of some aspects of law practice
and formalism is, perhaps, apparent; the link between this routine and lawyer
unhappiness is not.
V. CONCLUSION
Professors Stefancic and Delgado's book has given lawyers and those who
train lawyers something to think about. Their inquiry is a provocative one: does
something in the nature of legal formalism, which, they assert, is taught in law
school and dictates the structure of modem legal practice, make lawyers
unhappy? It would be nice if formalism were in fact the sole cause of lawyers'
discontent. If it were, the root of this pervasive problem would be identified, and
there would only be one problem to solve. However, as this review has indicated,
182. Rhode, supra note 172, at 1345 (citing Women in the Law Survey: Analyzing Job Dissatisfaction, CAL.
LAW., Jan. 1990, at 84).
183. Rhode, supra note 172, at 1338-39; see ANThoNY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAniNG IDEALS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 370 (1993).
184. Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America: Addressing Dysfunction in the Large Law
Firm, 31 GoNz. L. REv. 373, 384-85 (1996).
185. STEFANcic & DELGADO, supra note 1, at 45.
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the misery that plagues today's lawyers is likely more complex than the authors
admit. Their unhappiness may stem from the business into which law has
evolved. Or, it may have come from the very nature of the individuals who
become lawyers. Or, it may have something to do with the very nature of our
adversary system, which creates nothing but winners and losers. While formal-
ism may be one source of lawyers' unhappiness, it is unlikely the sole cause.
The way in which Professors Stefancic and Delgado approach the problem of
lawyer misery is certainly intriguing and has merit. By framing their thesis
around the story of the lives and work of Pound and MacLeish, Professors
Stefancic and Delgado open yet another window into an important subject and
pose a question that will likely resonate with many frustrated humanists who also
happen to practice law.

Critical Legal Ethics
REVIEW OF Lawyers Ethics and the Pursuit of Social Justice: A Critical Reader,
edited by Susan D. Carle,t foreword by Robert W. Gordon.4
REVIEWED BY PAUL R. TREMBLAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
These days, it is not easy being a progressive lawyer-one of those noble folks
who choose to work with disadvantaged clients and underserved communities.
Not because of the low pay or the diminished status that such lawyers may hold
within some professional circles-although both certainly could be considered
drawbacks. And not because the job is too tough; being a progressive lawyer is no
doubt hard work, but it is certainly far more gratifying than most of the
alternatives.' No, being a progressive lawyer is tough because of the increasing
uncertainty that progressive lawyers encounter as they try to make sense of the
responsibilities inherent to their role. In the olden days, it seemed like lawyers for
poor people had a pretty well-defined role in life. They went to court and fought
hard to win important rights for their clients. Of course those lawyers faced some
hard choices-for example, whether to focus on individual client work or on
bigger, and often sexier, law reform work-but, for the most part, public interest
and poverty lawyers were, first and foremost, good, creative litigators on behalf
of their clients.
These days, things are not so simple, but they are a whole lot more interesting.
Thanks to waves of critical scholarship produced over the past 25 years about
progressive lawyering and the role that law and legal institutions generally play
in our society, most of the simple role conceptions and understandings about
public interest and poverty law work have been (if you'll excuse the phrase)
deconstructed and obliterated. Over the past several years, thoughtful scholars
have rigorously reexamined how lawyers and clients might best work together
and how power in their working relationships ought to be identified and
negotiated. Critical thinkers have conceived alternative visions of lawyering
t Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
t Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School.
* Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I extend my thanks to Dean John Garvey and the
Boston College Law School Fund for financial support for this project, and to Ben Forsdick, Boston College
Law School Class of 2008, and LaKay Cornell, Boston College Law School Class of 2009, for their helpful
research assistance.
1. See Jean Koh Peters, Habit, Story, Delight: Essential Tools for the Public Service Advocate, 7 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 17 (2001) (recounting the joys, and travails, of a lawyer working in a public interest setting).
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practice, visions that embrace a greater respect for the power of community;2
deeper attention to the influences of race, gender, class, and culture on the
practice of law as well as on the relationship between the professional and her
client; 3 and more honest acknowledgement of the special tensions inherent in
lawyering for disadvantaged peoples.4 Today, virtually all of the previously
accepted understandings about what it means to "practice law for poor people
' 5
are contested in some fashion. And, importantly, the traditional dogmas have not
yet been replaced by new ones. The sophistication and diversity of the arguments
surrounding the role of progressive lawyers have prevented new understandings
from coalescing. The newer developing wisdoms are tentative, and the explora-
tions continue apace. It is therefore a great time to be a progressive lawyer, even
if the role may not be an entirely comfortable one.
The scope of the literature about critical lawyering 6 is vast. With so much
written and so many ideas in play, interested readers would benefit a great deal
from anthologies presenting representative samples of prominent works in the
field. Unfortunately, few such focused collections exist.7 Professor Susan Carle, a
2. For a sampling of this scholarship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of
Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies];
Susan D. Bennett, Lawyering for a New Democracy: Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their
Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 469; Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly,
A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443 (2001); Michael Diamond, Community
Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 67 (2000); Zenobia Lai, Andrew
Leong & Chi Chi Wu, The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 ASIAN
PAC. Am. L.J. 1 (2000); Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLiNicAL L.
REv. 147 (2000).
3. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the
Intersection of Race, Space and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1927 (1999); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris,
Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. Rev. 1585
(1997); Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 443 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition and Professional Responsibility, 57
MD. L. REv. 1502 (1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action:
Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 768 (1992); Edgar S. Cahn, Reinventing Poverty Law,
103 YALE L.J. 2133 (1994); Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcs 369 (2004); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on
Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modem, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1099 (1994) [hereinafter
Simon, Dark Secret]; Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice,
8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469 (1999); Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients and Social Change,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415 (1996); Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyeringfor Poor Communities in the
Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813 (1998).
5. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049-59 (1970).
6. In this review I use the terms "progressive" and "critical" interchangeably, recognizing that in some other
contexts the terms might acquire differing meanings.
7. A few important collections offer some exposure to the progressive lawyering and cutting edge clinical
scholarship. See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERING: POLMcAL CoMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY: READINGS FOR LivE-CLiENT CLINICS (Alex
J. Hurder, Frank S. Bloch, Susan L. Brooks & Susan L. Kay eds., 1997) [hereinafter CLNICAL ANTHOLOGY];
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legal historian and ethicist from American University Washington College of
Law, has finally prepared one such compilation. Her textbook, Lawyers' Ethics
and the Pursuit of Social Justice: A Critical Reader,8 is a welcome and
illuminating contribution to the world of critical lawyering scholarship.
Carle's textbook assembles forty excerpted articles, essays, and book chapters,
each critically appraising some specific aspect of lawyering or legal education.9
Several of the articles Carle includes are well-known classics, and while some
others are less familiar, at least to me, they are no less valuable. Each selection
makes an important contribution to the rich and sophisticated debate currently
underway regarding the proper role of lawyers who confront the injustices of
contemporary society.
Carle ostensibly focuses on legal ethics in this compendium, but her reach is in
fact broader than that, and happily so. Her book has very little-indeed, almost
nothing-to do with the "typical" subjects of legal ethics scholarship including
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,t° the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers," and the substantive law of lawyering. Instead, Carle's
book focuses on tough questions about lawyers practicing as noble, justice-
seeking actors in a system grossly tilted in favor of entrenched and powerful
interests. If this is part of what we talk about when we talk about legal ethics,
12
then her book is indeed an ethics text. But instead of relying on the typical
LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE:
PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003). Several important freestanding books
develop discrete critical lawyering ideas in depth. See, e.g., GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE
CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY (1988); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000);
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE
LAWYERING (2004); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998).
8. LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005)
[hereinafter LAWYERS' ETHICS].
9. All but one of the excerpts were previously published elsewhere. The exception is the splendid
contribution of David Luban. See David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra
note 8, at 355.
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
12. See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model
Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243 (1985) (borrowing his title from RAYMOND CARVER, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN
WE TALK ABOUT LOVE (1981)). One scholar recently has suggested a very narrow definition of "legal ethics":
"Legal ethics, however, is much more circumscribed [than religious and theological ethics]. Its core is in codes
and rules; it is a technical subject in which one learns, for example, the intricacies of conflicts and of reasonable
fees; it is tested on multiple choice exams." Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal
Ethics, 66 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1253, 1253 (1998). For a more expansive view, and a disagreement with Professor
Griffin on her definition, see Thomas D. Morgan, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal
Ethics-A Response to Professor Griffin, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1317 (1998); see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
75 (1994), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 271 [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux]
("broadly defined 'legal ethics"' includes "leading our lives as lawyers, making decisions about our clients, our
opponents, ourselves, and our families, searching to be 'good lawyers' as well as 'good people').
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doctrines that most legal ethics textbooks do, Carle's work digs deeply into
emerging lawyering praxis theories and jurisprudential questions about the nature
of social justice in a way that few law school texts have attempted.
Part II of this Review describes the essays and the viewpoints Carle has chosen
to include in this collection and distills some of the critical messages that she
hopes students will take away from her text. Carle has chosen wisely, both in
terms of the content of the selections and in how she presents them. Most of the
important progressive lawyering critiques find some air time in her book, and
their messages are subtly spread among otherwise unconnected readings. Part III
revisits three of the book's more prominent themes, all intertwined cross-currents
within the writings. The three chosen in this Review for closer scrutiny are (1) the
contours of client-centeredness as an orientation for lawyer-client associations,
(2) the challenges of what we might call community or "rebellious" lawyering,
and (3) the persistent problem of moral activism. Part III of this Review reveals
how deftly Carle has highlighted these and other contested lawyering theories,
but also points out the inevitably introductory nature of a compilation like this.
Part IV wraps up with some thoughts about how teachers might make the best use
of this rich and valuable resource.
II. THE READINGS
Carle organizes her essays1 3 in an unexpected but ultimately useful way. Her
editing of the original works is superb. 1 Each chapter begins with a very helpful
introduction by Carle about her goals in including the selections in that chapter
and how they might relate, followed by a series of questions for the reader to
consider. She organizes the readings into two broad parts: one labeled "Theory
and History" and the other "Contemporary Critical Approaches"; the former
reads somewhat as background to the spirited debates found in the latter. As is
true with so much of this book, the segments intersect in intriguing ways.
Important themes that emerge in the historical background section play a key role
in the later discussion of the contemporary struggles about proper lawyering roles
and responsibilities.1
5
13. For simplicity's sake, in this Review I shall often refer to each of the excerpted selections as an "essay,"
even though few of them would have been labeled essays in their original versions. With Carle's distilling the
lengthy pieces into 7-12 pages of insight and argument, the extracts as they appear in the book read as essays.
14. Carle's ability to cull small fragments of longer pieces and leave a coherent, readable product is indeed
impressive. While any reader familiar with a piece's full text can quibble about what ideas Carle has chosen to
include and what parts she has omitted, for the most part (there are a couple of exceptions) the edited readings
flow gracefully and articulately.
15. In preparation of this Review, I have opted to read the essays as they appear in their abridged form in
Carle's book, and not to read each piece in its original text. I had read many of the original articles or books in
the past, but certainly not all of them, and any previous reading tended to be some years ago. I chose to focus
exclusively on Carle's edited selections in order to situate myself as close to the role of a new reader as possible,
and to discern from the excerpts what Carle has presented for us. Some of my comments below will reflect that
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Within "Theory and History," Carle first offers four articles that critically
appraise the legal profession's regulatory schemes and the justifications for its
monopoly status. She begins with a classic, and quite cynical, commentary by
Richard Abel,t6 who argues that the American Bar Association's ethics codes and
rules serve no purpose other than to reinforce and legitimate the profession's
monopoly power. Carle balances the Abel argument with a somewhat more
hopeful, if still critical, sociological argument from Terence Halliday t7 who
argues that lawyer regulation and monopoly reflect "an implicit concordat
between states and established professions," by which the professions agree to
provide important public services in return for their notable advantages.1 8 With
those divergent orientations in place, Carle then offers David Wilkins's account
of four types of lawyer regulation and his assertions about the essential role of
context in any consideration of controls over lawyer behaviors.' 9 This theme of
contextual reasoning remains a central one for the remainder of the book.
Another pivotal focus of the book's remaining essays appears in Lucy White's
article about structuralist and Foucaultian visions of power relationships.2 °
Following three essays explicitly about professional regulation, White's medita-
tion at first seems out of place, but it is hardly so. By introducing Foucault's
theories about the shifting, unpredictable quality of power, challenging more
simplistic traditional visions of the powerful on one side and the powerless on the
other, White's article begins a process of unsettling accepted wisdoms and
resisting categorical thinking that becomes quite important later in the book.
Carle next turns to historical accounts of the profession's development from
the early 19th century to the present. Some of these essays present essentially
orientation, as, for instance, when I evaluate a piece's limited explication of a certain point without
acknowledging whether the original text had offered more depth.
16. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REv. 639 (1981), reprinted in
LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 18. As I refer to each of the pieces in this anthology, I shall cite to its original
source and thereafter refer to it in its form and location within Carle's book.
17. TERENcE C. HALLIDAY, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises, and Professional Empowerment, in
BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT, reprinted in LAWYERS'
ETtcs, supra note 8, at 25. I found the Halliday piece to be one of the two least accessible pieces in the
collection-not because of a shortcoming in Carle's editing skill, but because of Halliday's cramped writing
style, at least to my eye. (As we see below, the other similarly challenging essay is the selection by Anthony
Alfieri. See infra note 159.).
18. Id. at 29.
19. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1992), reprinted in
LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 31.
20. Lucie E. White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1499 (1992), reprinted in
LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 41 [hereinafter White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness]. In this essay White
describes and defends "a new field of critical reflection on advocacy and pedagogy-a 'theoretics of practice,"'
id. at 43, which, emerging from theories developed by Clifford Geertz and Michel Foucault, establishes the
fluidity of power and the possibility of collaboration resistance among those otherwise deemed powerless.
White suggests that progressive lawyers may learn a great deal from the theoretics of practice movement about
navigating the power relationships between the professional and her clients, and between those clients and the
structural institutions affecting their lives.
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descriptive history, including pieces by Clay Smith,2 ' Susan Carle,22 and Genna
Rae MacNeil 23 about the lawyers and the tactics of the early NAACP. Carle also
includes two articles that discuss important Black women lawyers in the early
20th century by Virginia Drachman24 and Kenneth Mack25 and two other articles
by Jerold Auerbach 26 and Carrie Menkel-Meadow 27 which offer a sociological
view of the stratification and power imbalances in the profession in the past
centuries. Other offerings in this section of the textbook are best labeled as
intellectual histories---or glimpses thereof. Four essays address historical under-
standings of the "republican" 28 vision of the role of a lawyer. Russell Pearce
argues that early legal ethics writing was quite republican in its ethos, 29 while
21. J. Clay Smith Jr., Emancipation, in EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER 1844-1944
(1993), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 109.
22. Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW AND HIST. REV.
97 (2002), reprinted in LAWYERS' EmIcs, supra note 8, at 114.
23. Genna Rae MacNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights, in
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIL RIGHTS (1990), reprinted in
LAWYERS' ETIcs, supra note 8, at 120.
24. Virginia G. Drachman, The New Woman Lawyer and the Challenge of Gender Equality in Early
Twentieth-Century America, 28 IND. L. REV. 227 (1995), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 85.
25. Kenneth W. Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie TM. Alexander and the Incorporation
of Black Women into the American Legal Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1405 (2002), reprinted in
LAWYERS' ETHIcs, supra note 8, at 92.
26. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, A Stratified Profession, in UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 40 (1976), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 79.
27. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics,
Diversification, and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621 (1994), reprinted in LAWYERS'
ETHICS, supra note 8, at 99 [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash].
28. As used in the historical chapters of this book, the phrase "civic republican" tends to correspond to the
more contemporary phrase "moral activism," in connoting a vision of lawyering committed to the virtuous
ideals of a community and resistant to individual client claims when those claims portend harm to the larger
community. Writers often employ the phrase in that general spirit, although at times with emphases different
from those found here. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic
Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81
GEO. L.J. 2243, 2249 (1993) (describing a similar notion of civic republican thought as "the potential for
virtuous citizens to engage in a political dialogue that generates public values and identifies a common good");
Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View
of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 696-97 (1994) (stressing the importance of
narrative in civic republican conceptions and noting "[c]ivic republicanism is a political theory based on
popular participation in dialogue about the common good"). Feldman's description of civic republicanism
correlates well with another prominent theme of the Carle book, that of the power of narrative as a source of
ethical meaning. Compare Feldman, supra, at 2248 ("Dialogic politics.., generates or produces public values
and legal norms: politics, in short, is jurisgenerative."), with Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The
Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS,
supra note 8, at 295, 304 ("We must actively engage the full breadth and depth of [our clients'] narratives to
honestly and effectively further our analysis. What we will come to know as a result of this inquiry will be
altered by the contextualized process through which we have come to know it .... [S]uch a theory-building
practice is a distinctly ethical project.").
29. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 242 (1992), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 53 [hereinafter Pearce, Rediscovering the
Republican Origins].
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Norman Spaulding is less persuaded. 30 Robert Gordon connects the early
republican visions of civic virtue to the lawyer elites, whose wealth and power
permitted a more independent professional philosophy, one less tied to client
self-interest. 3 ' And Clyde Spillenger acknowledges a republican strain in the
work of Louis Brandeis, but with a more critical eye than one usually encounters
in writings about Brandeis.32
The remaining two "historical" pieces in this section of Carle's book are
landmark writings about the tensions inherent in public interest work. The first,
by Derrick Bell, criticizes the ethical choices made by desegregation lawyers in
the 1960s and 1970s for their disconnection to client community viewpoints.33
The second is a classic essay by Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson (now Jeanne
Charn) which canvasses ethical frictions that emerged within the poverty law
movement of the 1970s.34 These two selections presage later discussions in the
textbook about client-centeredness, moral activism, and community lawyering.
The second section of Carle's textbook is more inclusive than the first. Her
label, "Contemporary Critical Approaches," serves as an umbrella for everything
else she wants to include after the historically-focused introduction. Carle
explores a number of important critical perspectives under this second heading.
She opens with a subchapter that she calls "Clinical Approaches," by which she
means perspectives arising from the experiences of clinical law professors and
their developing scholarship.35 The label is of course broadly flexible, as
clinicians have been writing about nearly every aspect of lawyering theory and
practice over the past 30 years. But the inclusion of these perspectives is a
welcome acknowledgement to the always-underappreciated clinical world.
30. Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum
Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETIcs, supra note 8, at 61.
31. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1988), reprinted in LAWYERS'
ETHics, supra note 8, at 66 [hereinafter Gordon, Independence ofLawyers].
32. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445
(1996), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 72. Commentators frequently cite Brandeis favorably for
his early championing of a more socially responsible lawyering ethic. See, e.g., LuBAN, supra note 7, at 237-38
(praising the "Brandeisian vision of moral activism"); John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The
Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 741, 744; David
Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 717, 720-35 (1988); Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REv. 963, 980 (1987); William H. Simon, Babbitt
v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REv. 565, 565-66 (1985).
33. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 128.
34. Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public
Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337 (1978), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHIcs, supra note 8, at 136. The Bellow
and Kettleson article is an important contribution and easily warrants inclusion in Carle's collection, but its
placement within the "historical" chapter seems odd. While the article was written many years ago (close to
thirty years as I write), it neither describes a historical development nor captures the profession at a particular
moment in time. Indeed (and this may be a sobering realization), the issues raised so elegantly by Gary Bellow
and Jeanne Charn in 1978 remain just as relevant today and have not been resolved to anyone's satisfaction.
35. LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 145.
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Carle presents two such clinical approaches in this subchapter. The first, which
Carle calls "client-centered/collaborative lawyering," includes excerpts from
four well-known articles, each offering a general embrace and constructive
critique of the client-centeredness model of lawyer-client interaction.3 6 Robert
Dinerstein examines the interpersonal and ethical underpinnings of the deep-
37 3rooted client-centered stance. Lucy White38 and Binny Miller9 each use
affecting client stories to test the practice of collaboration. In the final excerpt,
Michelle Jacobs criticizes the neutral, autonomy-focused qualities of client-
centered counseling for marginalizing clients of color.40 Collaborating with
clients, rather than lawyering for clients, is an important characteristic of
progressive clinical scholarship, and these four pioneering pieces afford students
a few important glimpses into the unsettling challenges of such a seemingly
simple prescription.41
The second clinical approach explored in Carle's book represents a strand of
scholarship that may be in tension with the "client-centered/collaborative"
model. Carle calls this approach "community/rebellious lawyering, ' 42 and, as its
name implies, its adherents resist much of the client-centeredness model of
lawyering which, they argue, places too much emphasis on the individual client.
The book includes three excerpts here, starting with a chapter from Gerald
L6pez's pioneering work, The Rebellious Idea of Lawyering Against Subordina-
tion, which established "rebellious lawyering" within the lexicon of the critical
36. While thoughtful critics have continued to refine its understandings, the central premise of client-
centeredness-that lawyers ought to respect the ultimate choices of their clients, rather than seek to impose their
own choices, on questions of legal objectives as well as tactics-has become established doctrine within the
academy. See Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation,
12 CLINICAL L. RaV. 369, 370-71 (2006) ("[T]he client-centered approach remains the predominant model for
teaching lawyering skills .... [I]t is not an exaggeration to say that client-centered representation is one of the
most influential doctrines in legal education today."). Client-centeredness as a model for lawyering work is
widely attributed to the pathbreaking work of David Binder and Susan Price. See DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
37. Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 501
(1990), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 151.
38. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 157 [hereinafter White,
Sunday Shoes].
39. Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 485 (1994), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 169.
40. Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 8, at 181.
41. I explore this particular topic at greater length in Part I of this Review.
42. LAWYERS' ETmIcs, supra note 8, at 187. Carle notes that many scholars in this area understand the terms
"collaborative" and "community" lawyering as referring to the same approaches. Id., Introduction, at 5. See,
e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541, 544-45
(2006) (choosing "collaborative" to capture the terms "community," "mobilization," and "rebellious"). Carle is
correct to separate the labels, though, as the comparison between the White and Miller pieces and the L6pez
piece in this book tend to show. See infra text accompanying notes 89-148.
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scholarship world.4 3 L6pez distinguishes those good faith, earnest, but ultimately
ineffectual regnant lawyers who use their considerable skill and dedication to try
to achieve legal advances for their disadvantaged clients, from the more creative,
community-based rebellious lawyers who eschew traditional litigation and
legislative advocacy in favor of organized resistance and lay advocacy.44 L6pez's
piece is followed by two more focused examples of community lawyering, one
by Christine Zuni Cruz describing lawyering stories from the Pueblo of Isleta in
New Mexico4 5 and the other by Victor M. Hwang telling a tale of organizing and
advocacy within the Hmong communities of Northern California.46 Whether
either of these excerpts in fact presents a truly "rebellious" vision of lawyering is
a question that students will want to consider carefully, and one which this
Review addresses below. 4 7 In addition to offering students concrete examples of
alternative visions of working with and for discrete communities, the Cruz and
Hwang essays reprise a significant topic for progressive legal practice--one
developed in the earlier essay by Michelle Jacobs 48-namely the role of
cross-cultural competence in effective lawyering.49
Carle's next chapter-which she labels "Critical Theories" in recognition of
the influences of Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Studies, and the body of
work popularly referred to as "LatCrit ' 50 and "FemCrit ' 51 studies upon the
43. Gerald P. L6pez, The Rebellious Idea of Lawyering Against Subordination, in REBELLIOUS LAWYERING,
supra note 7, reprinted in LAWYERS' ETIcs, supra note 8, at 187.
44. Id.
45. Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5
CLINICAL L. REv. 557 (1999), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETmcs, supra note 8, at 201.
46. Victor M. Hwang, The Hmong Campaign for Justice: A Practitioner's Perspective, 9 ASIAN L.J. 83
(2002), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 210.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 128-48.
48. Jacobs, supra note 40.
49. The Jacobs, Cruz, and Hwang essays in their distinctive ways argue for cultural sensitivity when working
with different clients, for the development of cultural competence, and for a healthy wariness of stereotyping
and "essentializing" at the same time. (The book's essay by Angela Davis, discussed below (see infra text at
note 56), addresses essentialism in feminist legal theory, as does Lucy White (see White, Seeking the Faces of
Otherness, supra note 20, at 43).) Carle does not, though, include in her selections any in-depth discussion of
how lawyers (or students) manage that balance in their daly client work. For two sources that attempt such
practical advice, see Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINICAL L. REv. 33, 99 (2001); Paul R. Tremblay & Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Heuristics and
Biases, in THE AFFECIVE ASSIsTANcE OF COUNSEL: PRACrICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION (Maijorie A.
Silver ed., 2006).
50. See, e.g., Espinoza & Harris, supra note 3.
5 1. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education
or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988). For an assessment of the emerging
subgroups within Critical Legal Studies, see Jerry L. Anderson, Law School Enters The Matrix: Teaching
Critical Legal Studies, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201 (2004) ("[T]he [Critical Legal Studies] movement has now
fragmented, to a large extent, into various interest groups of 'outsiders'-RaceCrits, LatCrits, QueerCrits,
FemCrits, and so on-that in many ways have differentiated or distanced themselves from the core principles of
the original CLS theorists.").
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development of "subversive,''52 cutting edge visions of lawyering practice and
ethics-consists of nine essays. Carle chooses two essays from the substantial
body of scholarship belonging to the field known as Critical Legal Studies (CLS).
While the first, a classic work by Peter Gabel and Paul Harris, 55 clearly fits within
the CLS label, the other, William Simon's groundbreaking article on ethical
discretion in lawyering," is a less obvious member of the CLS genre. 55 Carle
follows her CLS offerings with three Critical Race Theory pieces by Angela
Davis, 56 Bill Ong Hing,57 and Anthony Alfieri.58 Each of these articles addresses
the connection between race-consciousness and actual lawyering practice.
Carle completes her review of critical theories with four essays labeled
"Feminist Theory/Legal Praxis," despite the fact that all of the critical theory
essays, indeed most of the offerings in the book, touch on "legal praxis" themes.
52. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990),
reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 283.
53. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice
of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETIcs, supra note 8, at 230.
54. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988), reprinted in
LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 238 [hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion].
55. While William Simon's scholarship may comfortably entitle him to membership in the CLS club, see,
e.g., Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 4; William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 469 (1984); William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REv.
487, 551-59 (1980); William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REv. 29 (1978); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop As A Vehicle For Affordable
Housing In A Race And Class Divided Society, 46 How. L.J. 85, 115 (2002) (describing Simon as a "critical
legal theorist"), his most famous article may seem to some too allied with mainstream legal values to qualify for
CLS status. In Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, Simon advocates a "professional duty" and a "substantial
responsibility for vindicating substantive merits" in legal disputes. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54, at
238, 243. The "justice" championed by Simon is reflected in the substantive legal merits of a dispute, and is not
dependent, Simon insists, upon a lawyer's "moral" assessment of the circumstances. Id. at 243-44. Simon's
arguments therefore imply an acquiescence in mainstream legal obligations, in ways different from the common
CLS views describing substantive law's inclination "to legitimize a social order that most people find alienating
and inhumane" (Gabel & Harris, supra note 53, at 231), and arguing that "the legal system works.., to shape
popular consciousness toward accepting the political legitimacy of the status quo" (id.). Scholars have critiqued
that quality of Simon's jurisprudence, which relies significantly on the philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. See
David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REv. 873, 901 (1999) (believing Simon might
have "too much faith in law"); Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World,
51 STAN. L. REv. 973, 984 (1999) ("Do we really want lawyers, as professionals, to identify the demands of
justice with even an idealized, deep-digging interpretation of extant law? Is our law really that good?").
Simon does expressly credit his "ethical discretion" ideas not just to Dworkin's influence, but also to the
arguments developed by the CLS scholars. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54, at 247. Bradley
Wendel acknowledges Simon's crediting of CLS but finds it inconsistent with Simon's Dworkinian faith in
law's determinate nature. W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The
Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 987, 1028 (2006) [hereinafter Wendel, Client Selection].
56. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 13
(1998), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETmcs, supra note 8, at 245.
57. Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common
Good, 47 STAN. L. REv. 901 (1995), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 258.
58. Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 935 (1999), reprinted in LAWYERS'
ETHics, supra note 8, at 265 [hereinafter Alfieri, Ethic of Justice].
CRITICAL LEGAL ETHICs
Her selection of feminist theory essays includes an excerpt from Carrie
Menkel-Meadow 59 on feminism and the developing an "ethic of care" in
lawyering (contrasted with a more traditional "ethic of justice"), Angela Harris's
deliberation on how gender essentialism risks silencing the voices of black
women,60 Lani Guinier's review of her empirical study of women's experiences
with traditional law school training, 6 and Phyllis Goldfarb's elegant linking of
feminist jurisprudence with the contextual ethical stance emerging from clinical
education experiences.62
The Critical Theories chapter teases the reader with an assortment of
subversive ideas-or, ideas that at least seem subversive relative to conventional
professional responsibility teachings. The authors included in this chapter
illuminate the importance of contextual, rather than categorical, thinking. They
rebel at the notion that there are simple right answers to the problems faced by
lawyers and at the idea that there are universal rules for lawyers to learn and
follow. Each demands frank attention to the effects of power, race, sex, and class
in lawyering, but the authors refuse, for the most part, to suggest or define rigid
protocols to which lawyers ought to adhere in their practice,63 a not surprising
conclusion given their resistance to categorical approaches to the fluid and often
messy world of practice. These authors, like others featured in the book, intimate
a deep skepticism about traditional zealous advocacy roles for lawyers out of a
concern either for the lawyers' clients-who may prefer or prosper under an
alternative, less adversarial stance-or for those third parties on the receiving end
of adversarial tactics, notwithstanding the clients' preferences. They also imply
an approach to moral truth which favors dialogue and care over a hierarchy of
rules and principles. 64
Carle follows these critical theory selections, which make up the most
substantial segment of the book, with three shorter chapters that veer away from
the critical. Instead, these chapters offer insights about lawyering practice from
important contemporary perspectives. The title of Chapter 6, "Legal Ethics
59. Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 12, at 274.
60. Harris, supra note 52, at 283.
61. Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE I
(1998), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETnICS, supra note 8, at 289.
62. Goldfarb, supra note 28, at 295.
63. The exception might be Angela Davis and Bill Ong Hing, two writers considered Critical Race Theorists,
each of whom proposes new rules for lawyers requiring explicit attention to race in certain lawyering settings.
See Davis, supra note 56, at 246 (proposing "the use of racial impact studies in prosecution offices to advance
the responsible, nondiscriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion"); Hing, supra note 57, at 261-62
(proposing "a specific set of rules and guidelines that lawyers would be obligated to follow in cases involving,
or potentially involving, racial and ethnic tension," including requiring alternative dispute resolution in cases
where the parties "are of different racial or ethnic groups").
64. Carol Gilligan's work, not surprisingly, is an important, but critically appraised, influence within this
book. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
(1982), referred to in Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 12, at 274; Goldfarb, supra note 28, at 297.
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Exploration through Literature, Myth, and Popular Culture," is a rather ambitious
heading for two pieces. The first of these is Paul Bergman's entertaining frolic
through classic films about redemptive legal practice; 65 the second is an
important article by Rob Atkinson that connects Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains
of the Day66 (the book, not the movie) to themes emanating from the moral
activism debate percolating within various strains of legal ethics literature.67
Neither of these essays specifically addresses the interplay between popular
culture's visions of lawyers and the roles that lawyers adopt in their working
lives-although Bergman's piece comes close.68 Instead, these pieces serve to
connect themes that appear elsewhere in Carle's book-including client-
centeredness, moral activism, and justice-to the stories encountered in the films
and literature explored by Bergman and Atkinson.
Chapter 7 confronts a topic that is increasingly debated within the legal ethics
community: the role of religious commitment on the proper functioning of a good
lawyer. In this chapter, entitled "Legal Ethics and Religious Commitment," Carle
presents three essays by Stephen Carter,69 Russell Pearce, 70 and Thomas
Shaffer.71 The essays she has chosen are interesting, readable, and provocative.
Each addresses an important question about good lawyering, but none grapples
directly with what seems to be a most important question within this realm:
whether religious values are in some way independent of, or add to, the moral
values attendant to the lawyering questions explored in each essay.72 It is also
noteworthy, although perhaps not unexpected given the book's commitment to
social justice from a progressive perspective, that Carle has included three essays
from the left of the political spectrum, and none from the right, whose views
would have the potential and propensity to use religious commitment to develop
65. Paul Bergman, The Movie Lawyers'Guide to Redemptive Legal Practice, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1393 (2001),
reprinted in LAWYERS' Emcs, supra note 8, at 309.
66. KAZUO ISHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF THE DAY (1990).
67. Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of THE REMAINS OF
THE DAY, 105 YALE. L.J. 177 (1995), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 317.
68. Carle cites to some articles offering that perspective in her Appendix, for students' further reading on this
topic. See Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 527 (1986); Marc
Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse, 66 U.
CIN. L. REv. 805 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can They Do That? Legal Ethics in Popular Culture: Of
Character and Acts, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1305 (2001).
69. Stephen Carter, Panel Discussion: Does Religious Faith Interfere with a Lawyer's Work?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 985 (1999), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETmIcs, supra note 8, at 329.
70. Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEx. TlEcH. L. REv. 1259 (1996), reprinted in
LAWYERS' ETIcs, supra note 8, at 339 [hereinafter Pearce, Jewish Lawyer 's Question].
71. Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?, 23 GA. L. REV. 1201 (1989), reprinted
in LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 343.
72. For an insightful article touching on the relationship between Jesuit training and teaching good
lawyering, see Gregory A. Kalscheur, Law School as a Culture of Conversation: Re-Imagining Legal Education
as a Process of Conversion to the Demands ofAuthentic Conversation, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 333, 366-70 (1996).
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some very different conceptions of good lawyering.7 3
The book's final chapter joins the ongoing debate about legal ethics and the
posture of lawyers working for powerful corporate interests. Entitled "Future
Challenges: Corporate Power and Lawyers' Counseling Role," Chapter 8
includes two essays about Enron authored by two of the leading lights in the
academy, David Luban and Robert Gordon. Luban's essay74 revisits some of the
arguments about moral responsibility that he first developed more than twenty
years ago, but within the framework of the sobering practical experience of the
corporate scandals of the past decade, all of which involved lawyers in central
ways. Luban persists in his defense of activism, of course, but he recognizes that
powerful institutional and psychological forces operate to undercut its practical
usefulness. 75 In the other essay, Gordon 76 meditates on the special fiduciary role
of corporate counsel and offers a bold suggestion, which he fears may be an "idle
dream.",77 Gordon envisions "a separate professional role for a distinct type of
lawyer, the Independent Counselor, with a distinct ethical orientation, institution-
alized in a distinct governance regime" of particularized duties, rules and court
practices. 78 This Review will discuss both Luban's and Gordon's arguments
below in more detail when it considers the activist messages presented by Carle's
textbook.7 9
With this varied and eclectic mix of 40 essays by 38 scholars, Carle offers her
readers important but unsettling glimpses into most of the topics that a sustained
focus on the progressive pursuit of justice requires. None of her topics are
developed in great depth in the book, however, and Carle no doubt accepts that
necessary limitation. In the end, her book is a manageable read, and the essays are
edited down to accessible, though still challenging, excerpts. Because any one of
the essays excerpted in the book could serve as the source of serious, sustained
deliberation and examination, 40 such articles would result in an unwieldy,
73. See, e.g., John J. Fitzgerald, Today's Catholic Law Schools in Theory and Practice: Are We Preserving
Our Identity?, 15 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 245, 245 (2001) ("the Catholic law schools that train
future lawyers have a fundamental responsibility to take up Christ's call so that they may in turn inculcate a
sense of Christian mission in their students"). Fitzgerald opposes Catholic law schools' teaching in support of
"contraception, the morality of homosexual acts, and the ordination of women." Id. at 253-54; see also David L.
Gregory, The Bishop's Role in the Catholic Law School, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 23, 27 (1998-1999) (suggesting
"that resolute proponents of capital punishment or abortion-the secular champions of the culture of
death-[should] no longer be allowed a platform for such gravely immoral activities directly within the
Catholic law school").
74. Luban, supra note 9.
75. Id. at 365-68. For an understanding of Luban's earlier defense of the activist conception, see LUBAN,
supra note 7; David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal andAutonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004 (1990).
76. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CoNN. L. REV.
1185 (2003), reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHIcs, supra note 8, at 371 [hereinafter Gordon, Corporate Counselor].
77. Id. at 383.
78. Id. at 381.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 149-60.
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excessively dense book. The risks Carle assumed in offering abridged versions of
the essays were therefore worthwhile. At the same time, as Part III of this Review
describes, students using Carle's textbook will no doubt benefit from having a
teacher or discussion leader who can mine the numerous insights and cross-
current themes that emerge through the excerpts and, by helping students make
connections between these themes, support the students' development of a deeper
appreciation for the subtle and sophisticated arguments presented in each work.
Focusing on three of the more prominent themes that emerge in Carle's book, the
next Part of this Review will now try to make some of those connections.
No reader can finish a book like this without wishing that his favorite topic
received more attention, and I am no exception. I would have liked greater
attention to the challenges about the effective delivery of legal services to those
who cannot afford to pay for them-a "pursuit of social justice" theme if there
ever was one. The Bellow and Kettleson essay8° hints at the extent of the access
to justice problems, but does little more than that, and while some of the
rebellious lawyering essays suggest deprofessionalization as one way to reduce
the need for lawyers' services, none explores this idea in depth. In that same vein,
readers encounter nothing here about the professional ethical struggles that
surround lay advocacy, 81 or proposals for "unbundled" legal practices 82 and other
cutting edge devices to assist pro se litigants,83 or the ethics of triage within
public interest and legal services practice.84 The book also offers very little
inquiry into the recent transformation of the large law firm and the emergence of
an "eat what you kill" ethos within large, high-status legal practice settings.85
80. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 34.
81. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 7.
82. See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat: Reflections on the Fordham
Recommendations on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617 (1999); Mary Helen McNeal,
Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
295 (1997); Robert Bickel, Note, Limited Legal Services: Is It Worth It?, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 331
(2006).
83. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of
the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1987 (1999); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of
Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers'Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REv. 79
(1997).
84. The several discussions of the ethical stance involved in "impact lawyering" in the readings come close
to the questions of triage, but they do not deal with the question, noted in passing by Bellow and Kettleson, of
how lawyers who have too many clients might properly and ethically choose among them. See Bellow &
Kettleson, supra note 34, at 137. For a discussion of the ethics of triage, see Martha Minow, Lawyering for
Human Dignity, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 143, 148-61 (2002); Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very
Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2475 (1999) [hereinafter Tremblay,
Triage Among Poor Clients]; Wendel, Client Selection, supra note 55, at 1030-32.
85. Some references to that phenomenon appear in Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash, supra note 27, at 102,
and implicitly in Luban, supra note 9, at 361-62. For some careful exploration of the emerging patterns within
modem law firm culture, see MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BiG LAW FIRM (1991); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KiLL: THE FALL OF A
WALL STREET LAWYER (2004).
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Carle has reported that space limitations required her to cut some of those very
topics;86 a future edition may allow her the opportunity to address them.
III. THREE RECURRENT THEMES
This Part of the Review assesses what significant themes students might
ultimately appreciate from Carle's textbook. Part II offered a flavor of the
disparate points of view that are presented in the book. However, that Part simply
introduced these points of view without elaborating further. These disparate
points of view thus deserve more elaborate consideration. As noted above, there
is simply too much material and too many complex and sophisticated arguments
covered in the textbook for most readers to come away from it satisfied. A
thorough reading of each essay will no doubt provide insight, but also raise
important questions, and even cause the reader hesitations, doubts, and disagree-
ments. Each piece is by necessity incomplete: each provokes, but does not
resolve.
87
Three themes surface often enough in the book to warrant deeper examination.
This examination will ideally enable me to tease out the strands of meaning that
accumulate slowly over the course of the book. The three themes explored here
are client-centeredness, rebellious/community lawyering, and moral activism.
88
This Part will consider how those themes are presented through Carle's
selections, and examine whether readers who might otherwise be new to those
themes are likely to leave the text with an adequate understanding of the themes'
nuances.
A. CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING
In compiling a textbook on legal ethics and the pursuit of social justice, Carle
cannot avoid confronting some delicate questions about what it means for
lawyers to practice in a client-centered way. Her book apportions considerable
86. LAWYERS' ETics, supra note 8, at 7-8 (sharing in the Introduction her publishers' space restrictions and
her need, regretfully, to eliminate readings on invidious discrimination, mandatory pro bono, and unauthorized
practice restrictions).
87. This is a theme developed by Robert Gordon in his Foreword to the Carle book. See Robert W. Gordon,
Foreword to LAwYERs' ETmIcs, supra note 8, at xiii-xvi thereinafter Gordon, Foreword].
88. The three areas I chose to discuss are not the only ones I could have identified, although they are perhaps
the most prominent over the course of Carle's book. Another prevalent perspective in the book is one of the
contingency and fluidity of power, a message developed here with homage to the teachings of, among others,
Michel Foucault and Audre Lorde. See, e.g., LAWYERS' ETics, supra note 8, at 2; Goldfarb, supra note 28, at
304; Harris, supra note 52, at 285; Ldpez, supra note 43, at 198; Mack, supra note 25, at 97 (quoting Audre
Lorde: "Can the master's tools dismantle the master's house?"); White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness, supra
note 20, at 42; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 38, at 166. Carle's book also evidences a less prominent but still
frequent questioning of the propriety of lawyers violating some rules in the interests of some greater,
justice-driven good. See LAWYERS' ETHIcs, supra note 8, at 149; Bell, supra note 33, at 130; Gabel & Harris,
supra note 53, at 234; Hwang, supra note 46, at 222; Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 12, at 280.
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space to this issue, which was a sensible decision. Although Carle includes a
sub-chapter labeled "Client-Centered/Collaborative Lawyering, ' 89 client-
centeredness ideas show up in many other parts of the book as well. The book's
message is decidedly ambivalent about this model of lawyering, and for generally
wise and good reasons.
Let us begin with a brief precis about this lawyering orientation, the
acceptance of which is soundly established within clinical teaching and
lawyering scholarship.90 In its crude formulation, client-centeredness rests on
simple truths about the agency, and moral, relationship between a lawyer and her
client. 9 As Mark Spiegel pointed out many years ago, it is incoherent to look for
meaningful distinctions between substance and procedure in lawyering work.
9 2
The traditional liberal notion that clients choose the ends in their legal
relationships, and lawyers choose the means, is unsustainable.93 As first crafted
by David Binder and Susan Price, the client-centered model rejected that
traditional formulation and allocated essentially all lawyering decisions to
clients, except those which are purely functionary and logistical.94 That
conception makes good sense, at least until several problematic nuances arise.
For example, lawyers are agents and clients principals. Principals hire the agents
and direct their work. Therefore, according to the nature of their agency
relationship, lawyers can never know clients' preferences and wishes as well as
clients themselves do.95
Carle's essays do not develop fully the primitive model of client-centeredness
just described.96 And although students using this text in a clinical program will
almost assuredly have encountered that rudimentary formulation, those studying
it in a professional responsibility course may not have done so. What readers of
Carle's book will discover, instead, are several questions that critical scholars
pose about the apparently sensible client-centeredness orientation.
89. LAWYERS' ETHIcs, supra note 8, at 145 (including the essays by Dinerstein, supra note 37; Jacobs, supra
note 40; Miller, supra note 39; and White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 38).
90. See Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 152; Jacobs, supra note 40, at 181; Kruse, supra note 36, at 370-71.
91. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 67 (1979). Client-centeredness emerges from traditional agency conceptions because, as
an agent for her principal, a lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to follow the principal's wishes. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) AGENCY § 385 (1958); James Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law and the Characterization "Officer of
the Court," 48 BUFF. L. REv. 349,403 (2000). It also emerges from the moral commitment to the client's right to
autonomy and to be free from unwanted paternalism. See Kruse, supra note 36, at 400.
92. Spiegel, supra note 91, at 71-72.
93. Dinerstein points out that this false distinction survives in the rules about allocation of decisionmaking.
Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 155-56; see MODEL RULES R. 1.4.
94. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 36. David Binder and Susan Price have refined their ideas in two later
editions of that classic text. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991); DAVID BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004).
95. See Kruse, supra note 36, at 378 (summarizing that position).
96. See Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 152-53.
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As previously indicated, the essays in this book collectively underscore the
significance of context, contingency, and skepticism in lawyering and in
relationships. 97 That theme is quite apparent in the book's treatment of
client-centeredness. Robert Dinerstein, in the excerpt Carle includes in her book,
highlights at least two important doubts about a straightforward, non-contextual
vision of client-centeredness. The early commitment to client-centeredness
emerged from progressive criticism of the traditional lawyer-dominated model of
client counseling, an approach that withheld from clients a respectful equality
and a share of power in the relationship.98 But, as Dinerstein reminds us, the
commitment to client-centeredness for lawyers working with powerful clients
translates easily into a "hired gun" paradigm which amplifies power to those
interests "so powerful as not to need further empowerment." 99 He hints that
lawyers ought to withhold client-centeredness from powerful clients, who have
less need for autonomy and who-the argument implies-will use any autonomy
to further injustice. 1° ° Dinerstein does not demonstrate in this brief excerpt how
lawyers might accomplish that feat, and indeed the suggestion seems rather
visionary. But his suggestion alludes to a second, related criticism of client-
centerednesss, a critique that will tie into a later theme of Carle's book that this
Review will next examine: that of moral activism.
Client-centeredness serves as a vehicle to enhance a client's autonomy-the
right of the client to control her life and her affairs. However, that reality can
trigger important moral questions when clients opt to use their lawyers' services
for unjust ends. Any defense of client-centeredness must craft a distinction
between respect for a client's preferences (which are idiosyncratic to the client)
and respect for the client's moral choices (which are decidedly not, unless one
accepts a purely relativist outlook). Dinerstein perceives this concern, but does
not elaborate on it in the excerpt provided by Carle in the book. In the excerpt,
Dinerstein does imply that lawyers ought to be humble in their moral assessment
of client choices, lest lawyers "impos[e] their values" on their clients.10° This
argument invites, but does not receive in the book, a spirited rejoinder.'° 2
97. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
98. See Kruse, supra note 36, at 375; Spiegel, supra note 91, at 49-72.
99. Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 154.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 156.
102. Dinerstein's resistance to lawyers' imposition of values on clients materializes in his criticism of
William Simon's Ethical Discretion in Lawyering. See id. at 156 (citing Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note
54. His criticism as it appears here is not fully persuasive, however. Dinerstein worries about Simon's lawyers'
"denying [clients] the opportunity at least to seek vindication of hypothetically legal interests." Dinerstein,
supra note 37, at 156. If by "hypothetically" Dinerstein means "unmeritorious," then Simon indeed would
suggest such a denial, but for good reason. If by "hypothetically" Dinerstein means "possibly justified," then he
mischaracterizes Simon's position, which calls for the exercise of ethical discretion only when, in the lawyer's
judgment, the lack of legal merit is clear. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54, at 239-40. Simon also
does not argue that lawyers should "impose" any "values" on clients, although he does argue that lawyers must
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In addition to highlighting worries about the client-centered approach's
propensity to support powerful interests and to sustain immoral enterprises,
Carle's book exposes its readers to the cultural imperialism that some client-
centered literature invokes. Michele Jacobs warns about that danger:
The irony of the [client-centered] models is that they were constructed to return
the client to the centrality of the lawyer's work. Yet, even with the best of
intentions, lawyers most concerned with preserving the autonomy of client
decision-making have, by adopting the "client-centered" model of counseling,
continued to place the client, especially the client of color, out at the margin.
10 3
Jacobs's excerpt presents a critical, but seemingly misleading, message for its
readers. Her essay demonstrates elegantly, even in its abridged version, how
race-neutral models for interviewing and counseling are apt to disappoint and to
marginalize clients of color. More puzzling, however, is her argument that by
adopting client-centered models lawyers contribute to that wrongdoing ."t Is
Jacobs suggesting that lawyers ought to reject client-centered approaches, in
favor of a more paternalistic stance, in order to lawyer more effectively across
cultures? That cannot be, and in fact is not, her argument. However, the segment
quoted above, which is central in the excerpt provided by Carle, tends to
mischaracterize her message.
Jacobs's disagreement is not so much with the baseline idea of client-
centeredness, or with its premise that lawyers ought to respect the preferences of
their clients. Indeed, the thrust of her argument advocates more respect for, and
greater efforts to understand, what the client holds dear, especially (but not
exclusively) when the lawyer and the client are from different cultures.10 5
Jacobs's objections surface not from the commitment to respecting client values,
but from the "neutral skills" 10 6 training that early editions of the most prominent
interviewing and counseling texts seemed to advocate.10 7 Those books might
have been read to assume that clients are largely fungible. Jacobs persuades her
share the value of respect for the legal merits of a dispute. See id. at 244 (resisting what Simon calls "the
specious law-versus-morality characterization" of moral activism).
103. Jacobs, supra note 40, at 181 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 184.
106. Id. at 182.
107. In her original article, Jacobs reviewed the messages, implicit and explicit, of two leading interviewing
and counseling textbooks at that time. See Jacobs, supra note 40, at 353-61 (reviewing BINDER, BERGMAN &
PICE, supra note 94, and ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990)). No doubt in response to reviews like Jacobs's,
later skills texts have attempted to address the question of cross-cultural lawyer-client interactions. See, e.g.,
BINDER, BERGMAN, PRICE & TREMBLAY, supra note 94, at 34-38, 287, 395; JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA, ROBERT F.
COCHRAN & MARTHA M. PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAw: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (2d ed. 2006); STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., EssENTIAL




readers they assuredly are not, and that dimensions of class, race, gender, and
ethnicity influence the attorney-client conversation in important ways.
Jacobs's homage to cultural competence as a critical lawyering skill supports,
rather than undercuts, the central client-centeredness commitments, as long as
those commitments include a robust and contextual understanding of the client
and her community. The theme of cross-cultural awareness appears frequently
throughout Carle's book. The essay by Christine Zuni Cruz'0 8 emphasizes her
special connections to her Pueblo community and its traditions and sources of
meaning. The excerpts from Lani Guinier,109 Angela Harris, ° Bill Ong Hing,"'
Victor Hwang,' 12 Phyllis Goldfarb, 113 and Rob Atkinson' 14 each reflect, albeit in
different ways, the importance of attending to race, ethnicity, gender, culture, and
class in the development of effective lawyering theory.
One last client-centeredness complication presented by Carle's book deserves
some attention. The selections presented in the book when read together highlight
the contrast between crude notions of client-centered lawyering and more
thoughtful conceptions of lawyering strategy and argument, as developed in the
essays by Lucie White and Binny Miller. As they relate to strategic decisionmak-
ing, the crude formulations look something like this: lawyers best understand the
risks and implications arising from lawyering alternatives, but responsibility for
selecting among those alternatives must rest with the client who best understands
his risk-aversion, preferences, "values," and the like. The lawyer's assigned
undertaking is to describe, neutrally (lest she unnecessarily influence the client),
the terrain, the alternatives, and the likely consequences of the representation,
and to assist the client to make choices based on the client's personal
predilections. The lawyer's job therefore includes "the identification and
assessment of alternatives and consequences, and assist[ing] client[s] in making
decisions based on [the clients'] unique priorities, values and objectives."'1 15
Absent some morally unacceptable ambitions by the client, each actor in this
relationship has a clearly defined, and separate, role to play.
Lucie White and Binny Miller, adherents of a "collaborative" model of
lawyering, complicate this elegant if sterile role-assignment scheme. They
complicate the role designations in a way characteristic of so many essays in
Carle's book-by introducing the contexts and contingencies of class, race,
culture, sexual orientation, and power dynamics, reflected in the client's (and his
108. Cruz, supra note 45.
109. Guinier, supra note 61.
110. Harris, supra note 52.
111. Hing, supra note 57.
112. Hwang, supra note 46.
113. Goldfarb, supra note 28.
114. Atkinson, supra note 67, at 326.
115. Laura Cohen & Randi Mandelbaum, Kids Will Be Kids: Creating a Framework for Interviewing and
Counseling Adolescent Clients, TEmp. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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or her community's) narrative. Carle offers us Lucie White's evocative story of
the welfare fraud hearing for Mrs. G., a black mother of five children, 1 6 and
Binny Miller's compelling account of her students' representation of Jay, a black
(and gay?) man charged with the crime of resisting arrest after a shoplifting
allegation. 117 Both narratives engender conflicting notions of lawyering and
client autonomy that may perplex student readers.
The White and Miller excerpts demolish the neat role distinctions just
described. Lucy White's essay depicts a true encounter in which she, as a legal
services lawyer, and Mrs. G, as White's client, prepared for and attended a
welfare hearing. The essay illustrates the limits of sensitive, client-focused
advocacy. Despite her lawyer's creative and thoughtful legal strategies, Mrs. G.
defied the dictates of her role as "client," and supplied her own theory of the case
at the hearing. One of White's claims is that, as she writes, "Mrs. G. was a better
strategist than the lawyer-more daring, more subtle, more fluent-in her home
terrain." '118 White's narrative extols collaborative lawyering, but also unsettles
any simplified visions of that alliance. Particularly interesting is White's message
that collaborative lawyering may serve both the end of client empowerment and
the goal of effective legal advocacy." 9
Miller's story is similarly ambiguous and disquieting for adherents of a
simplified client-centeredness approach. Miller "urge[s] lawyers to set aside their
own stories in favor of client stories,"'120 and to "incorporat[e] client narratives in
litigation,'"1 2 1 especially into what clinical teachers describe as developing a
persuasive theory of the case.122 In assessing her client's case, Miller offers
insightful reflections about how her students' understanding of the role of race,
116. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 38, at 157.
117. Miller, supra note 39, at 169.
118. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 38, at 167.
119. White's story and analysis are ambiguous about a seemingly important instrumental consideration.
White recounts that Mrs. G. flaunted White's careful if conventional strategic planning in favor of her own
tactics, and, as noted in the text, White admires Mrs. G.'s nimble read of the terrain. White also reports that Mrs.
G. ultimately won her hearing in the end (after losing before the official who presided at the hearing). An
implication from the Sunday Shoes story is that a collaborative lawyer will respect her client's choices and win
more cases as a result. It is not hard to imagine a dissenting argument-that the collaborative approach instead
offers a poignant trade-off between those two goals. The lawyer may be instrumentally better trained to
manipulate mainstream legal processes, but her technical training may lead her to misrepresent her client's life
and diminish the client's power in the process. I developed that point in an earlier article. See Paul R. Tremblay,
A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. Rev. 123, 126-27, 129 (1992).
120. Miller, supra note 39, at 169.
121. Id. at 170.
122. Traditional clinical training has emphasized the importance of developing a "theory of the case" around
which to organize strategic planning. See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:
MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 273-429 (1978); John B. Mitchell, Narrative and
Client-Centered Representation: What Is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6
CLINICAL L. REv. 85, 105-06 (1999); Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and Illustration of
the Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REv. 611 (1987). Miller makes clear her goal of
developing effective lawyering theory, one that does not lose sight of the trier of fact:
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and perhaps of sexual orientation, in the client's story can make the litigation
arguments much more persuasive, while acknowledging that her client had
chosen not to present that particular case theory. While urging lawyer reticence
toward imposing narratives on clients and constructing litigation themes for
them, Miller implies that her client might have benefited from the insights that
she and her students had developed about his case.' 23 Although White's essay
suggests the prospect that clients' strategic choices might be more effective as
litigation devices than their lawyers' ideas (a contention which law students
paying $40,000 per year for three years of training will surely resist), Miller's
essay appears more conflicted on that score.
Like White's earlier piece in Carle's book, 124 and the essays by Mack,
125
Harris, 126 and Goldfarb, 127 the Mrs. G. and Jay stories evoke the interplay of race,
class, gender, sexual orientation, and oppression on ordinary lawyering theories
and teachings. While championing the role of client narrative in everyday legal
case development, these excerpts provoke important questions about the
instrumental implications of doing so. The simplified teachings of the crude
client-centeredness models may be easier for students to learn, but the lessons
from the essays by White and Miller strike me as more genuine.
B. REBELLIOUS/COMMUNITY LAWYERING
A second cross-current running throughout Carle's book is that of "rebellious,"
or community, lawyering. Students of legal ethics in a conventional classroom
setting are unlikely to encounter the conception of community lawyering because
it is a developing (and contested) theory not closely connected to typical private
law firm practice. 128 Even students learning legal ethics within clinical programs
My aim is to articulate a theory of case theory that is truer to the client's life experience and to what it
is that lawyers actually do. By defining case theory as an explanatory statement linking the case to the
client's experience of the world, we create a context for seeing what we might not otherwise see ....
Case theory makes actions seem quite reasonable that at first seemed unreasonable, and it allows us to
accept the client's story and at the same time have a plausible explanation for other stories.
Miller, supra note 39, at 176. Miller's assertions may depart from White's claims about the instrumental
effectiveness of the collaboration. See supra note 20.
123. Miller, supra note 39, at 177 ("Why did [Jay] tell a story at the trial that avoided the question of race? If
we had discussed these issues, Jay might have been more hopeful about his case or might have better understood
the implications of a race theory.").
124. See White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness, supra note 20, at 44-45.
125. Mack, supra note 25, at 97.
126. Harris, supra note 52, at 283.
127. Goldfarb, supra note 28, at 304-05.
128. Most professional responsibility casebooks do not address this aspect of critical lawyering. One
exception is the casebook by Deborah Rhode and David Luban, which addresses these tensions within public
interest law and excerpts articles by Shauna Marshall and Stephen Wexler. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVm
LuBAN, LEGAL ETHics 846-53, 862-71 (4th ed. 2004) (excerpting Marshall, supra note 2, and Wexler, supra
note 5).
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may not confront literature describing the phenomenon. 129 Carle's book therefore
offers students an important introduction to this progressive notion of lawyering.
In conventional conceptions of the lawyer/client interaction, the lawyer serves
as a helpful expert who aims to solve a client's problems using the lawyer's
hard-earned proficiency in the specialized world of law, regulation, and
procedure. Client-centered lawyers use that proficiency in ways directed largely
by their clients. Progressive lawyers often operate in that same fashion, but with a
goal of protecting civil rights or resisting oppressive state or corporate powers,
even if the client is not paying for the legal services. Whether progressive or
mainstream, client-centered or lawyer-directed, the interaction looks as one
would expect, with a client hiring a lawyer to accomplish some defined goal that
is important to the client.
In contrast, the community or rebellious lawyering conception disclaims this
ordinary understanding. As introduced most prominently by Gerald L6pez,130 but
explored by a host of other critical scholars, 13 1 community lawyering refuses to
privilege the individual client as the source of direction for the lawyer or as the
one who can alone define the goals of the legal representation. This model also
refuses to privilege legal strategy as the product of the working relationship
between lawyers and their clients. Rather, community lawyering, as its name
implies, urges lawyers to respect the energy and the commitments of community
members working together and to collaborate with them for meaningful change,
emerging from political and grass-roots movements rather than from clever
advocacy efforts by smart lawyers in suits. L6pez calls the well-meaning,
instrumental lawyer-driven work produced by progressive lawyers on behalf of
disadvantaged clients "regnant lawyering." 13 2 In his view, regnant lawyering is
certainly good, but rebellious lawyering is a far more effective way for lawyers to
work with subordinated populations. 13
3
Carle's book is certainly not a "rebellious" treatise; it does not aim to present
community lawyering as the preferred way lawyers ought to practice with
disadvantaged communities. The readings Carle presents in this section include
many suggestions which could fairly be considered "regnant." But Carle offers
her student readers some beginning understandings about this orientation. Her
book provides enough of a taste to inspire some healthy curiosity about this
model while at the same time, and inevitably, leaving a number of questions
unexplored.
129. Only one textbook developed for clinical courses includes any serious exposure to community or
rebellious lawyering. See CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7.
130. L6pez, supra note 43.
131. See, e.g., Anthony Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 2; Cummings & Eagly, supra note 2; Gabel & Harris,
supra note 53; William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of
Community Organizations, 21 Omo N.U. L. REV. 455 (1994).
132. L6pez, supra note 43, at 193.
133. Id. at 196.
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Carle offers community lawyering lessons directly through three essays
explicitly labeled as such, and indirectly through allusions in other readings. The
L6pez excerpt 3'4 provides a lively, entertaining overview of the kind of lawyer
who works in a rebellious way, but the excerpt goes no further than that. t 35 The
essays by Cruz'3 6 and Hwang 137 present examples of lawyering within and for
disadvantaged communities, but neither fits exactly what I believe L6pez
envisions in his piece as true community lawyering. Cruz acknowledges that
"[c]ommunity lawyers grapple with the tension between 'zealous representation'
of individual clients and community concerns,"1 38 but the short excerpt in Carle's
book offers no rich example of lawyering (or organizing) work where a powerful
community need trumps an individual client's interests or wishes-which I
understand to be what Cruz refers to as the "tension" of community lawyering.13
9
At the same time, Cruz's essay underscores the importance, as noted in the Jacobs
essay,140 of cultural competence and sensitivity.
Hwang's essay describes wonderfully creative, energetic, but perhaps regnant
lawyering, if we apply L6pez's definition of that phenomenon. His essay vividly
captures, even if it does not (in Carle's excerpt, at least) develop or try to resolve,
some of the conflicts inherent in the rebellious stance. At times, Hwang writes
skeptically of the rebellious scholars:
The problem is that while we can debate the intangible but real harms caused by
the chasm between progressive theorists and practitioners, we cannot ignore the
daily injuries done to our communities by orchestrated assaults on their rights
and by barriers to the pursuit of legal recourse. Families that are being
unlawfully evicted, working in hazardous sweatshops, facing deportation, or
being denied basic life-sustaining benefits do not care whether the change is
temporary or systemic. They are concerned with the realities of food shelter,
health and employment. 141
134. Id.
135. L6pez's book, of course, explores those lawyers' practices in great depth. See L6PEz, supra note 7.
136. Cruz, supra note 45, at 205.
137. Hwang, supra note 46.
138. Cruz, supra note 45, at 205.
139. Cruz does offer an example that implies a sacrifice of personal interests in favor of community interests.
She describes a jurisdictional tension between the state courts of New Mexico and the Pueblos' tribal court
system over family law matters. The tribal court system will not provide for divorce decrees, only legal
separation orders for well-entrenched cultural and faith grounds. Cruz reports that her legal clinic has a policy
(which seems to be firm and independent of any individual client desire) not to use the state courts for any
family law result except to accomplish the divorce order which is unavailable in the tribal courts. Limiting
access to the state court system affords the clinic's clients some justice "with the greatest respect being accorded
to exclusive tribal jurisdiction." Id. at 208. Cruz observes: "The Pueblo stance on not providing for divorce is
deeply embedded in religion, yet the need for individual relief cannot be ignored. It presents a classic conflict of
community and individual interests . I... Id.
140. Jacobs, supra note 40.
141. Hwang, supra note 46, at 211.
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This passage represents the deepest triage-driven critique of the rebellious
stance-that lawyers who work for the long-term mobilization of the community
must ineluctably sacrifice the short-term needs of those community members.
42
If Hwang sounds rather regnant in the passage just quoted, he seems not to want
that label as evidenced by his later admiration for L6pez's rebellious ideas and his
effort to connect those ideas to the narrative he shares.
143
Hwang presents a rich story of lawyering, organizing, and legislative lobbying
with and on behalf of the Hmong community to change certain federal Social
Security and welfare laws which excluded many disabled Hmong immigrants
from income and health care benefits. His narrative serves as a provocative
exemplar from which to evaluate the competing lawyering theories running
throughout Carle's textbook. On the one hand, the creative work Hwang
describes seems quite lawyer-driven; on the other hand, because it engaged
substantial community input, relying on protests and similar mobilization efforts
within the Hmong neighborhoods, the action appears very community-driven. In
the end, the grass-roots campaign effected some significant change in federal
legislation and regulation, which sounds regnant given its focus on changing
discrete substantive law. 44 At the same time, the Hmong struggle with
Washington legislators and bureaucrats may serve as a satisfying example of the
best of community lawyering because of its reliance not on arguments made by
honey-tongued lawyers to judges, but instead on organized political pressures
from the community members themselves. 145 In this way, Hwang's essay serves
as a valuable resource through which student readers can begin to appreciate and
critique the conception of rebellious lawyering and its contrasts to good,
effective, instrumental regnant work.
The community lawyering themes found in Carle's book highlight one more
tension, which I will describe briefly before moving on. I noted above that a
rebellious, community lawyering stance is not always comfortably client-
centered. Long-term community goals are not always congruent with short-term
community residents' interests. Conflicts inevitably arise within the community,
calling for accommodation and reconciliation on the part of lawyers and leaders.
142. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 53, at 234-35 (suggesting that long-run gains ought to be preferred over
the short-term benefits of instrumental lawyering work). For a description of the triage-based worry, see Paul R.
Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HAsTINGS L.J. 947,
963 (1992). Hwang's ideas remind us, as Cruz noted above, that community lawyering is not necessarily
consistent with the commitment to client-centeredness. See Cruz, supra note 45, at 205.
143. Hwang, supra note 46, at 211-12.
144. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 53, at 230 (describing how regnant lawyers (but not using that term, as
the authors wrote before Ldpez) "discover that the expansion of legal rights has only a limited impact on
people's lives, and that even those limited gains can be wiped out by a change in the political climate").
145. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 34, at 140 ("In the long run, public interest lawyers cannot win such
games [of litigating for marginal victories] for their clients. Political organization and activity by disadvantaged
groups will be necessary to maintain, expand, and assure full implementation of any benefits and rights that
lawyers might establish.").
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Lawyers must choose some members within the community with whom to work,
as good faith representatives of the larger membership. Choosing some, of
course, means excluding others. The simplified construct of a lawyer neutrally
respecting the autonomy and values of her client therefore ill fits the more
nuanced work life of a community lawyer.
Readers of Carle's collection of essays will appreciate those tensions. The
uncomfortable interplay between respect for client wishes and protection of
community interests is especially well evoked in the excerpt from Derrick Bell's
memorable article, described earlier in this Review, which criticized desegrega-
tion lawyers in the 1960s and 1970s for pursuing litigation strategies with which
at least some members of the black community disagreed.146 Bell's essay is
powerful and trenchant, but its central argument-that the NAACP lawyers
should have exhibited greater respect for what Bell calls "the client's current
interests" when they differed from "the long range good of [the lawyers']
clients"147 -is not sufficiently developed or defended in the short selection in the
book given the power of available responses to it.' 48 Careful readers of Carle's
book will note the richness of the tensions raised by Bell and relate them to the
competing arguments and reflections presented by several other authors in the
collection.
C. MORAL ACTIVISM
A third recurring theme in Carle's textbook is that of moral activism. The
146. Bell, supra note 33. Bell's essay is found not within the client-centeredness or the community lawyering
subchapters of the book, but instead in the historical section.
147. Id. at 134.
148. To the extent that Bell argues that the NAACP lawyers chased their own glory with little regard to the
interests-long term or short-of the client community generally (see id. at 129 (noting Dr. Andrew Watson's
worry of the influence of "'narcissistic gratification' on the work of public interest lawyers)), then his critique
is of course a straightforward one. But from the excerpt presented here, the landscape is plainly more
complicated than that. If the lawyers (and the NAACP) believed in good faith that the long term interests of the
black communities were better served by their desegregation strategy even over the opposition of some present
members of that same community, it is not at all self-evident that the latter interests ought to trump the former,
or that the lawyers should not have respected the views of the NAACP leadership. For a discussion of this point,
see Tremblay, Triage Among Poor Clients, supra note 84, at 2477-79. For a recent revisionist historical review
of the lawyering and political stances of pre-Brown black lawyers, see Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil
Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005).
Bell's essay, as presented here, also leaves readers with some unresolved questions as he critiques the role of
the bar and professional regulators in discouraging the kind of overreaching about which he worries. Bell argues
that an approach found in the former Model Code of Professional Responsibility, "urging the lawyer to
'constantly guard against the erosion of his professional freedom' and requiring that he 'decline to accept
direction of his professional judgment from any layman,' is simply the wrong answer" to the problem of lawyer
overreaching. Such admonitions, in Bell's words, are "difficult to enforce." Bell, supra note 33, at 133-34. Afew
paragraphs later, though, Bell offers his own suggestion that "civil rights lawyers come to realize that the special
status accorded them by the courts and the bar demands in return an extraordinary display of ethical sensitivity
and self-restraint." Id. at 134-35. Readers of this excerpt may find it hard to reconcile Bell's Model Code
criticism with his own, equally unenforceable, proposal.
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notion that a good lawyer has a professional responsibility to attend to justice and
fairness concerns in her work, and not solely to the wishes and interests of her
own client, appears as a topic of discussion, centrally or otherwise, in at least 19
of the 40 essays in Carle's book. Virtually all of the discussion of this conception
appears in a favorable light. One therefore comes away from a reading of the
anthology with the understanding that moral activism tends to be a progressive
orientation-that the left, by and large, supports an activist stance and, by
implication, that the right would likely defend a more individualist, client-
focused stance, committed to zealous advocacy, moral nonaccountability, and
neutral partisanship. Although that perception may not be a terribly controversial
one, 149 it is probably an imperfect one. 150
Student readers of this book may not sufficiently appreciate how contested the
notion of moral activism remains among thoughtful scholars of legal ethics and
lawyering theory, although admittedly some objections to moral activism do
surface in a few of the essays. Upon reading the book students may also
under-appreciate some of the complications about what it means to adopt the
activist stance in day-to-day practice, and to live this philosophy as a lawyer-
although the delightful essay by David Luban covers some of that ground. 151
Carle's collection canvasses historical debates about the prominence, or not, of
"civic republican" visions of professional responsibility (which I read as a variety
of moral activism152) in the legal profession of the 19th and early 20th
centuries. 53 She includes two essays demonstrating how the writers' religious
commitments and teachings support their discomfort with an individualist,
149. Among the most prominent moral activist scholars are David Luban, Deborah Rhode, and William
Simon, all comfortably progressive in their lawyering theory scholarship. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 7;
RHODE, supra note 7; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985);
StION, supra note 7; Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54. By contrast, an early pioneer of the neutral
partisanship formulation (which resists moral activism) was Charles Fried, a noted conservative scholar, former
Republican administration official, and former Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See
generally Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060 (1976).
150. One thinks, for instance, of progressive critics of moral activism such as Stephen Ellmann, Abbe Smith,
and Bradley Wendel. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 116 (1990) (reviewing LuBAN, supra note 7, and resisting many of its activist arguments); MONROE H.
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETics (2d ed. 2002) (defending a zealous, partisan
posture); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 67
(2005) [hereinafter Wendel, Separation of Law and Morals]; W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 363, 364, 399 (2004) [hereinafter Wendel, Civil Obedience] (developing what he terms the "authority
conception," a form of "wide positivism" which may support much of the "loophole lawyering" decried by role
critics). The Anthony Alfieri essay included in this book contains some oblique criticism of William Simon's
activism from this critical scholar as well. See Alfieri, Ethic of Justice, supra note 58, at 266-68.
151. See Luban, supra note 9.
152. See supra note 28.
153. See Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 31; Pearce, Rediscovering Republican Origins,
supra note 29; Spaulding, supra note 30; Spillenger, supra note 32.
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zeal-driven lawyering ethos.1 5 4 Two other essays attempt to apply an activist
orientation in a practical way to the ethical challenges presented by the recent
corporate scandals such as Enron.155 Another captivating, but at the same time
somewhat perplexing, essay connects the activist debate (with some development
of the nonaccountability position) to the moral tensions developed in Kazuo
Ishiguro's novel The Remains of the Day. 15 6
Carle's book includes one essay directly aimed at articulating and defending
one version of the activist project-William Simon's defense of a lawyer's
professional duty to exercise "ethical discretion" and to seek justice. 157 However,
the book does not include any scholarship directly arguing the opposite
proposition. 58 Two essays on topics other than activism pointedly disagree with
Simon's thesis, but neither in a very elaborate or even very persuasive way.159
154. See Carter, supra note 69, at 329; Pearce, Jewish Lawyer's Question, supra note 70, at 340.
155. See Gordon, Corporate Counselor, supra note 76; Luban, supra note 9.
156. Atkinson, supra note 67. Here is why I describe Atkinson's piece as "perplexing," at least as it gets
excerpted here. Atkinson seems rightly critical of Stevens, the butler in the Ishiguro novel (think Anthony
Hopkins here), whose commitment to his role responsibilities permits him to carry out the order from his
employer, Lord Darlington, that he fire the two Jewish servants working on the employer's estate because the
servants are Jewish. He compares Stevens's reasoning in the novel to that of the supporters of neutral
partisanship in lawyering theory. Id. at 321. Atkinson is evidently more sympathetic to the posture of Stevens's
compatriot, the former head housekeeper Kenton (think Emma Thomson), who voices her outrage at Stevens's
bureaucratic response to what she recognizes as clear injustice. Atkinson likens her response to that of the moral
activists. Id. at 324-25. The fictional account, then, sets the stage for some lessons about lawyers' duties. In
assessing the "two competing approaches open to contemporary American lawyers in such a situation,"
Atkinson concludes that "[elither answer, standing alone, is inadequate, but the story itself presents a more
satisfactory, but by no means perfect, response .... [But] Stevens and Kenton failed to choose that alternative."
Id. at 320. Intriguing, right? But the excerpt here does not depict the unchosen, "more satisfactory," alternative.
The most apparent reading is that Atkinson refers to the telling of stories itself as the "more satisfactory"
alternative he prefers. In that case, readers are left without a convincing explication of exactly how the telling of
stories affects (or effects) the moral landscape-and, notably, the moral decisionmaking-inherent in the order
from Lord Darlington.
157. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54.
158. The extensive literature on activism versus neutral partisanship reads something like an ongoing,
sophisticated contest of ideas. For one early, noteworthy point-counterpoint presentation of that contest, see
Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM.
B. FouND. REs. J. 613 (1986); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986
AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 637 (1987). In recent years, Bradley Wendel has added a deeply thoughtful, intricate, and
quite philosophical perspective to this conversation. See Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 150; Wendel,
Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 150.
159. See Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 156 (criticizing Simon's proposal for its encouragement of lawyers'
"imposing values" on clients and for "fail[ing] to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of lawyer
power"). Simon's defenders would disagree with Dinerstein's critique. The only "values" Simon suggests
lawyers ought to pursue are those of legitimate legal merits; anything resembling "imposition" occurs only
when clients wish their lawyers to take advantage of system failures to achieve illegitimate gains; see also
Alfieri, Ethic of Justice, supra note 58, at 268 (accusing Simon of "a crabbed notion of the 'public dimension' of
client-group loyalty" of "offer[ing] little guidance in the effort to reintegrate [the values of family, group, and
community] into a richer conception of other-regarding loyalty relevant to the support of 'third party and public
interests,"' of "reinvigorati[ng]... the vitality of legal liberalism," and of idealizing the lawyer who "may
simply reenact his own private moral preference at the expense of a client-community participatory
resolution"). Alfieri's criticism is harder to assess, if only because Alfieri's writing is itself more difficult to
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The result of all this is that Carle's book is generally supportive of a
justice-driven, activist stance for lawyers, highlighted frequently in many essays
but not subjected to serious, reflective scrutiny. Given the inevitable compro-
mises that any compilation such as this will reflect, as its editor aims for a
comprehensive but also manageable reader, 16° Carle's selection and editing
choices may have been the very best available. Intrigued but skeptical students
will easily find a trove of insightful scholarship on the activist project and, if a
book such as this spurs a serious investigation into the merits of that project, it is
hard to be unhappy with Carle's approach.
IV. SITUATING CARLE'S BOOK IN THE CURRICULUM
I end this Review with a few thoughts about how Carle's valuable book might
find its way into the hands of law students. First, it is worth emphasizing that this
book'does deserve a prominent place within the law school curriculum. Carle
notes in her introduction that the book should serve as a versatile, relatively
inexpensive supplement to, rather than replacement for, a traditional legal ethics
or professional responsibility casebook for use in a conventional legal ethics
course. 161 I hope Carle is right but worry that her aspirations may be too
ambitious. My concern, of course, is that her book is too rich and too intricate to
fit that bill. In light of the many themes the book seeks to cover and to connect
with one other, it will be rather challenging for students to appreciate its nuances
if they read selected passages as a break from the doctrinal law of lawyering
found in more traditional legal ethics casebooks. Given the increasing complexity
of the doctrinal developments within the field of lawyer regulation and liability, it
is hard to imagine that this book will earn the consideration it deserves as an
add-on to the usual lessons covered in a traditional legal ethics course. 162 It
would, however, be wonderful to accomplish that feat, and, as the legal academy
is full of talented teachers, I do not wish to discourage anyone willing to try.
follow and understand fully. Simon's purposivist proposals may reinvigorate liberal legalism, see supra note 55,
but his notion of justice may incorporate more community norms than Alfieri is willing to concede. See William
H. Simon, A Brief Rejoinder to Comments on the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 991, 1003-04 (1999)
(responding to Alfieri's criticism); West, supra note 55, at 982-84 (crediting Simon with a broader view of "legal
merits" than implied here).
160. Its editor tells us she agrees wholeheartedly. See LAWYERS' ETmcs, supra note 8, at 7 ("The hardest part
of editing this book has been deciding what to leave out.").
161. Id. at 6. Robert Gordon echoes that sentiment in his Foreword. See Gordon, Foreword, supra note 87, at
XV.
162. Here's one teacher's story: I have taught this semester a three credit classroom course (four if a student
elects to write a separate paper) called simply Professional Responsibility. My students read the newest edition
of Stephen Gillers's bountiful and witty casebook. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS
OF LAW AND ETacs (7th ed. 2005). I have found it difficult to cover in a three-credit course enough of the
developing doctrine governing the legal profession, including expanding liability theories, multijurisdictional
and multidisciplinary practice innovations, Sarbanes-Oxley implications, and so forth. Adding enough of
Carle's book to do it justice in a course like mine would be challenging, it seems.
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My sense is that Carle's book fits more comfortably in two other settings in law
school. The first, and more obvious one, is for use in a specialized seminar or
classroom course, perhaps called something like "Legal Ethics and the Pursuit of
Social Justice." A professor teaching such a course could easily use Carle's book
to introduce students to virtually all of the significant intellectual and political
visions developed by critical scholars of legal ethics over the past few decades.
The professor could effectively use Carle's book in conjunction with the full text
of some of the essays or other related readings-which Carle's Appendix
helpfully references. 163 That's a seminar I would love to teach, and indeed would
love to take. The other potentially well-suited use for this book is in the seminar
component of a clinical course, especially in clinics that aim to teach students as
much about the broad themes of a lawyer's role, ethics, and justice as they do
about substantive law or skills training. When considering this book as a
supplement in a clinical setting, some risks inevitably arise: namely, that the
richness of the readings and their interrelatedness might call for more in-depth
discussion than the clinic seminar might ordinarily permit. However, while a
more traditional legal ethics course will tend to cover much doctrine and
regulation that is absent from Carle's anthology, the curriculum of many clinic
courses is likely to focus on precisely the issues presented so well in Carle's
book.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawyers' Ethics and the Pursuit of Social Justice: A Critical Reader is
impressive both in its scope and in its elegance. Carle presents a rich compilation
of insightful and innovative scholarship in a way that is at once accessible and
challenging. Her book is therefore a welcome addition to the prolific field of
scholarship about progressive legal ethics and lawyering theories. The book is
more directly relevant to students' inquiries about these theories and models than
are some of the more sociologically or philosophically focused collections that
address cause lawyering. And, thanks to Carle's careful editing, this book is more
approachable than many others covering similar themes. Its limitations are
apparent and not unexpected. Carle has chosen breadth over depth, and it is hard
to quibble with that judgment call. Readers new to the contested terrain
concerning progressive lawyering will come away from this book with many
unanswered questions, some vigorous skepticism, and, importantly, a hunger for
a deeper understanding of the complexities of good and noble lawyering. Those
readers will perhaps be more disquieted after reading this book than before, but
they will be more enlightened and more wise.
163. LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 8, at 385-98.
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